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This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – 
NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Acknowledging the unique position and 
influence of the United States, the thesis sets out to assess whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy 
is compatible with a strong and effective NPT, in what ways U.S. nuclear policy underpins the 
role and strength of the NPT, how this policy could be detrimental to the viability of the treaty, 
and whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy should and could be changed in order to align with the 
NPT. Based on the acknowledgement that nuclear disarmament is the key venue for U.S. impact 
on the NPT, the thesis seeks to answer the research questions by analysing U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy in light of the so-called “Thirteen Steps” for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In 
short, the thesis concludes that current U.S. nuclear weapons policy is incompatible with a strong 
and effective NPT because this policy undermines the bargain that lies at the heart of the NPT: 
states without nuclear weapons agreed to forsake them; states with nuclear weapons agreed to 
eliminate them. In order to mediate harmful aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the United 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
ABMT  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
BMD   Ballistic missile defence 
CCCW  Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
CTBT   Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty   
CTBTO   Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation 
CTRP   Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
DNWS  De facto nuclear weapon state 
DOD   Department of Defence 
DOE   Department of Energy  
DPRK   Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea 
FMCT   Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
GTRI   Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
HEU   Highly enriched uranium 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM   Intercontinental ballistic missile 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
IMS   International Monitoring System 
LEU   Low-enriched uranium  
LTBT   Limited Test-Ban Treaty 
MIRV   Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle 
NNSA   National Nuclear Security Administration 
NNWS  Non-nuclear weapon state 
NPR   Nuclear Posture Review 
NPT   Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
NSWMD  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
NWS   Nuclear weapon state 
NWSP   Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan  
OPLAN  Operations Plan 
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PAROS  Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
PMDA  Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement 
PNI   Presidential Nuclear Initiative 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
RNEP   Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator  
RRW   Reliable Replacement Warhead 
RRWP   Reliable Replacement Warhead Program  
SLBM   Submarine-launched ballistic missile 
SORT   Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
SSBN   Ballistic missile submarines1 
SSP   Stockpile Stewardship Program 
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UN   United Nations 

















                                                 
1 The SS stands for “ship submersible,” the B denotes “ballistic missile” and the N denotes “nuclear powered.” 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. 
 
Although the viability of the NPT does not depend on the United States alone, the unique position 
and influence of the United States suggests that U.S. nuclear weapons policy has great potential 
impact on the NPT.2 Historically, the United States has been a major driving force in most 
international non-proliferation efforts, including the negotiation and implementation of the NPT.3 
Together with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the United States was the first state to 
sign the NPT, thereby committing itself to the proclaimed goal of a world free of nuclear 
weapons. However, the United States was also the first state to develop, and the first and only 
actor to date to have used nuclear weapons in war.4 It has also been conducting more nuclear tests 
than all other states put together, and has been developing one of the largest nuclear arsenals in 
the world.5 Today, the nuclear arsenal of the United States counts for over 40 percent of the 
nuclear weapons in existence.6 Moreover, the U.S. and Soviet doctrines of mutually assured 
destruction, famously satirised in Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy Dr. Strangelove,7 held the 
world hostage and spelled the end of human civilisation during the so-called Cold War.8 Since 
the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the leading military power in the world by 
far, has the world’s largest economy, and is the most influential actor in global affairs.9 U.S. 
policies are followed, and deeply affect the policies of every state in the world. They have an 
                                                 
2 Mærli and Lodgaard (2007) 
3 Bunn (2006) 
4 The United States dropped a nuclear bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and another bomb 
on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. The necessity of dropping the nuclear bombs to achieve victory over the Japanese 
Empire remains controversial. 
5 More than 2.000 nuclear test explosions have been conducted around the world. Over 1.000 of them were 
conducted by the United States. For a complete list of global distribution and geography of nuclear weapons tests, 
see Diehl and Moltz (2008:215). 
6 This number is only surpassed by Russia, which possesses over 50 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons (SIPRI 
Yearbook 2008). 
7 The full title of the film is Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964). The 
film depicts how an irrational U.S. Air Force general orders a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union, leading to 
nuclear apocalypse. 
8 The term “Cold War” refers to the state of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from the mid 
1940s to the early 1990s. However, the term is somewhat misleading. Although the conflict did not escalate into an 
official state of war between the two parties, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars, 
such as in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. 
9 Diehl and Moltz (2008:75), Campbell (2005:18) 
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impact on everything from global and regional security to economic stability, international norms 
and practices, and the sustainability of whatever global consensus exists.10 The nuclear weapons 
sphere is no exception.11 U.S. nuclear weapons policy is scrutinized closely abroad, and has a 
major impact on nuclear efforts elsewhere.12 Hence, the United States has decisive leverage on 
the viability of the NPT, for good and for worse.13 
 
With all but a handful of states being signatories, the NPT is the most widely adhered to 
multilateral arms control agreement in history.14 Over the years the treaty has given rise to an 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT constitutes the backbone.15 The 
NPT consists of several legally binding and mutually reinforcing obligations and commitments 
pertaining to both nuclear non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament.16 The treaty is based on 
a bargain which obligates states which had not acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1967 to forsake 
nuclear weapons. In return those states which had acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1967, 
including the United States, promised to rid themselves of their nuclear arsenals. By establishing 
an international norm of peaceful and responsible nuclear behaviour, the NPT poses an obstacle 
to nuclear anarchy.17 Despite its shortcomings, the NPT has been highly successful in stemming 
nuclear proliferation since the treaty entered into force in 1970.18 However, the viability of the 
NPT is not guaranteed.19 
 
1.1. Research questions 
Acknowledging the role and possible impact of U.S. nuclear weapon policy on the NPT, the 
thesis sets out to answer the following research questions:  
 
1) Is U.S. nuclear weapons policy compatible with a strong and effective NPT?  
 
                                                 
10 Roche (2004), Campbell (2005:18, 23) 
11 Bunn (2006:20) 
12 Campbell (2005:20) 
13 Blix (2008:18), Lodgaard (2007) 
14 Mærli and Lodgaard (2007) 
15 Mærli and Lodgaard (2007), Bunn (2006) 
16 Persbo (2001) 
17 Goldblat (2007:29) 
18 Bunn (2005) 
19 Bunn (2006) 
   
 13 
2) In what ways does U.S. nuclear policy underpin the role and strength of the NPT, and how 
could this policy be detrimental to the viability of the treaty?  
 
3) Should and could the nuclear policy of the United States be changed in order to align with the 
NPT? 
 
1.2. Relevancy to peace studies 
Although few question the destructive power of nuclear weapons, some claim that nuclear 
weapons and their proliferation can induce “negative peace;” i.e. the absence of war. Operating 
with a core realist assumption that war becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to 
possible gains,20  they claim that nuclear weapons possession deters potential aggressors from 
deliberately resorting to war because the costs of nuclear retaliation is unacceptably high.21 
However, as critics of nuclear deterrence theory point out, one cannot presuppose that all actors 
perform a cost-to-gain ratio analysis before opting for war, nor that war cannot occur unless 
political leaders deliberately decide to embark on such a course.22 Although governments intend 
to behave rationally, they are influenced by factors which may conflict with or even hamper their 
ability to make rational decisions. Moreover, non-state actors are conceptually outside the bounds 
of nuclear deterrent because they have no “return address” to which to deliver a retaliatory 
nuclear strike.23 Thus, we do not know whether deterrence describes a condition that actually 
exists.24 What we do know, is that even if the risk of nuclear weapon use may be low, the 
probability of use, whether by states or non-state actors, cannot be zero.25 Instead of preserving 
“negative peace,” the risk of deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental nuclear launches is 
likely to increase with rising numbers of nuclear weapon possessors, critics argue.26 According to 
Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 2005 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the risk of nuclear weapon use and the need for nuclear arms control 
                                                 
20 Sagan and Waltz (2003) 
21 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001:354) 
22 The major debate on this issue has been between Kenneth Waltz, who argues that “more may be better,” and Scott 
Sagan, who argues that “more will be worse.” There positions have respectively become known as positivist (pro-
proliferation) and pessimist (anti-proliferation). For a full discussion on this matter, see Sagan and Waltz (2003). 
23 Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn (2007) 
24 Schell (2007:15) 
25 Quinlan (2007:9) 
26 Sagan and Waltz (2003) 
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has never been greater.27 In order to avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear 
war, as described in chapter 1.4, nuclear weapons should not proliferate, but be abolished, nuclear 
pessimists argue.28 Based on this view, the NPT is the only existing legal barrier against the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the only multilateral arms control agreement which 
contains a binding commitment to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.29 
 
Further, the NPT is not only important for the preservation of negative peace in the nuclear 
sphere, but for the building and sustainability of “positive peace.”30 While nuclear deterrence is 
based on mutual distrust and the constant threat of violence, which is incompatible with the 
establishment of positive peace, the NPT is a commitment of cooperation, goodwill and trust 
between neighbouring and rivalling states.31 By creating an international norm against nuclear 
proliferation, the NPT also induces some degree of predictability into international relations that 
makes it easier for states to trust each other and build “positive peace.” In order to ensure the 
viability of the NPT, specific challenges to its viability must be identified and overcome. This 
thesis hopes to make a modest contribution to that end. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
Following the introduction, chapter 2 provides the theoretical background and framework for 
answering the research questions. It presents the NPT in detail, and explores how the viability of 
the treaty is affected by different types of pressures. The theoretical chapter has been placed prior 
to the methodological chapter because the research design used to answer the research questions 
derives from the theoretical understanding of the NPT and the dynamics affecting the viability of 
the treaty. 
 
The research design is based on the acknowledgment that nuclear disarmament is the key venue 
for U.S. impact on the viability of the NPT. Methodological reflections on how I planned and 
                                                 
27 Spiegel interview with Mohamed ElBaradei (2007)  
28 Sagan and Waltz (2003) 
29 Persbo (2001:2) 
30 In peace studies, it is common to differentiate between negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace can be 
defined simply as the absence of war. It is a static definition of peace. Positive peace, on the other hand, is a more 
dynamic conception of peace. Positive peace is not only the absence of war; it is the continuous transformation of 
conflict through cooperation and non-violent means. Because it requires trust between parties, positive peace is by 
far the most difficult type of peace to achieve (Galtung, 1996). 
31 Bunn (2006:78) 
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executed the research study are briefly laid out in chapter 3. Here it is argue that the so-called 
Thirteen Steps are well suited as a tool for answering the research questions.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Thirteen 
Steps. 
 
Since the dynamics affecting the strength and efficiency of the NPT are discussed thoroughly in 
the theoretical chapter, the findings of the analysis and the conclusion have been merged into one 
chapter (chapter 5). Here the research questions are answered by discussing the analytical 
findings within the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. Some of the findings are also 
used to look ahead. 
 
1.4. Definitions 
Nuclear weapons, the proliferation of which the NPT is to halt, are not defined in the treaty. 
However, an authoritative definition already existed at the time the NPT was under negotiation.32 
In Article V of the 1967 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, nuclear weapons are defined as “any device which is capable of releasing nuclear 
energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate 
for use for warlike purposes.”33 Many effects of nuclear weapons are still unknown, but the 
overall potential of nuclear weapons to inflict violence on humans and the planetary environment 
we live in is hard to overstate. In addition to the shock and heat caused by the immediate blast, 
which also conventional weapons can produce, nuclear weapons cause long-term effects which 
conventional weapons cannot produce, such as radiation.34 Radioactive fallout can cause 
tumours, leukaemia and genetic damage.35 Some scholars also argue that a nuclear war would 
lead to a depletion of the ozone lair surrounding our planet, allowing more ultraviolet radiation 
from the sun through the atmosphere to the surface of the Earth, where it would produce 
dangerous burns and a variety of potentially dangerous ecological effects.36 Others argue that a 
                                                 
32 Goldblat (2007:10), Persbo (2001:5) 
33 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1967) 
34 www.atomicarchive.com/Effects 
35 Radioactive fallout is radioactive particles being dispersed over the earth during the hours, days and possibly 
months following a nuclear explosion. 
36 www.atomicarchive.com/Effects 
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nuclear war could cause a “nuclear winter,” which could result in a mass extinction of life on 
Earth, including humankind.37  
 
Some nuclear weapon designs are highly complex, but basic design concepts are well understood 
and widely available.38 By far the most complicated part of building nuclear weapons is 
producing sufficient amounts of weapon-usable fissile materials. Fissile material is material that 
can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction, notably plutonium of any isotopic composition 
and highly enriched uranium (HEU).39 
 
Nuclear weapon states (NWSs) are defined in Article IX of the NPT as a state which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 
1, 1967. Thus, only the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the Republic 
of France and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are considered to be NWSs.40 All other 
states are considered to be non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs), and there are no provisions for 
them to accede to the NPT as anything other than a NNWS41. The problem with this definition, as 
I will discuss in more detail in chapter 2.4.3, is that there are states other than the United States, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, France and the PRC that possess nuclear weapons. To date, these 
include Israel, India, Pakistan and recently the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea 
(DPRK).42 To differentiate these states from the treaty defined NWSs, I refer to Israel, India, 
Pakistan and the DPRK as de facto nuclear weapon states (DNWS). 
                                                 
37 The nuclear winter theory holds that nuclear explosions will set off firestorms over many cities and forests within 
range, resulting in great plumes of smoke and dust being sent aloft into the atmosphere. These thick clouds could 
block out all but a fraction of the sun's light for a period as long as several weeks. The conditions of semidarkness, 
killing frosts and subfreezing temperatures, combined with high doses of radiation from nuclear fallout, would 
interrupt plant photosynthesis and could thus destroy much of the Earth's vegetation and animal life, including 
bringing humankind to the brink of extinction (www.atomicarchive.com/Effects). For a more detailed presentation of 
the nuclear winter theory, see Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack and Sagan (1983). 
38 For more detailed information on nuclear weapon concepts and designs, as well as the production of nuclear 
materials, see Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar (2005:45-54). 
39 The International Panel on Fissile Materials (www.fissilematerials.org) 
40 The United States tested its first nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945, the Soviet Russia on August 29, 1949, the 
United Kingdom n October 3, 1952, France on February 13, 1960 and the PRC on October 16, 1964. 
41 Johnson (2004:12) 
42 Although Israel officially maintains that it will not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle 
East, the Israeli nuclear weapons program was revealed to the public by former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai 
Vanunu in The Sunday Times on October 5, 1986. India conducted multiple nuclear weapon tests on May 11 and 13, 
1998. Pakistan responded by testing its first nuclear weapon on May 28, 1998. The DPRK demonstrated its nuclear 
capability through a nuclear test on October 9, 2006.  
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As implied in its name, the objective of the NPT is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. There are two types of nuclear proliferation: horizontal proliferation and vertical 
proliferation. Horizontal proliferation is used to describe the spread of nuclear weapons to 
additional states or recipients beyond those states that currently possess them, while vertical 
proliferation refers to a quantitative or qualitative increase of the nuclear weapons arsenal of a 
given state43. Correspondingly, there are two types of nuclear non-proliferation. Horizontal non-
proliferation refers to the prevention of an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear 
weapons, while vertical non-proliferation is used to describe the prevention of an increase in the 
quantity and quality of the nuclear arsenal of a given state. Vertical-non proliferation is a 
precondition for nuclear disarmament, which not only refers to the prevention of an increase in 


















                                                 
43 Persbo (2001:6-7) 
44 Because it is hard to assess if a reduction in quantity is nullified by an increase of the quality of nuclear weapons, 
the term nuclear disarmament refers to a qualitative as well as a quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons (Persbo, 
2001:41) 
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2. The NPT and its viability 
In order to answer the research questions, a theoretical understanding of the NPT and its viability 
is needed. The purpose of this chapter is to provide such a theoretical framework. The chapter 
begins by briefly presenting the background and history of the NPT. Next, the provisions of the 
treaty are presented. It is argued that the NPT can be understood as the result of a bargaining 
process in which states which had not acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1967 were obligated to 
forsake nuclear weapons, while those states which had acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1967, 
in return, promised to rid themselves of their nuclear arsenals. Special emphasis is given to 
Article VI of the NPT, which constitutes an important part of the bargain, but which has been 
subject to persistent and bitter disagreement throughout the history of the treaty. Acknowledging 
the successes of the NPT, the dynamics affecting the viability of the treaty are discussed. The 
chapter does not focus on specific events, but on different categories of pressure which put stress 
on the NPT and the international non-proliferation regime that it anchors. 
 
2.1. Background and history 
Following the conception of a possibly limitless supply of energy, nuclear programs were 
initiated by several states during the 1930s, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, 
France, the Soviet Union and the United States.45 Peaceful possibilities were soon overshadowed 
by the potential to unleash unprecedented explosive power for military purposes. During the 
Second World War, the United Kingdom and the United States combined their efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons into the U.S.-led Manhattan project. These efforts resulted in the world’s first 
nuclear explosion on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity site in Alamogordo, New Mexico. The 
destructive potential of this powerful new weapon was revealed to the world by the obliteration 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945.  
 
Although the implications of nuclear weapons and the necessity of preventing their future use 
was there for all to see, early post-war efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament at a 
time when the United States alone possessed nuclear weapons failed. Moreover, the 
demonstration of U.S. nuclear military power accelerated the ongoing nuclear weapons program 
in the Soviet Union, which succeeded in testing its first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949 at 
                                                 
45 Diehl and Moltz (2008) 
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Semipalatinsk in Soviet Kazakhstan. On October 3, 1952, the United Kingdom followed by 
testing a nuclear weapon off the coast of Western Australia, and on February 13, 1960 France too 
joined the nuclear ranks by conducting a nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara desert. Many other 
states pursued or consider acquiring nuclear weapons, including Australia, India, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, among others. If the number of states to possess nuclear 
weapons continued to grow, it was believed that the risks of nuclear war would greatly increase.46 
 
In 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations therefore unanimously approved a 
resolution on the “Prevention on the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,” calling on all 
states to conclude an international agreement to refrain from acquisition and transfer of nuclear 
weapons.47 This was the first step leading to the adoption of the NPT. The nuclear test by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), hostile to both the United States and the Soviet Union, in Lop 
Nur on October 16, 1964, further catalysed the non-proliferation efforts already under way.48 
However, although the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons was undisputed and the 
moral opprobrium against nuclear weapons was shared by both possessors and non-possessors,49 
nuclear weapons were also regarded by many states as the ultimate security guarantee.50 
Operating with an assumption that war becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to 
possible gains; nuclear weapons were believed to deter potential aggressors because the 
destructive potential of a nuclear retaliation made the costs of resorting to war unacceptably 
high.51 Especially the two rivalling superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, based 
their national security on a nuclear second-strike retaliation capability to deter each other. The 
nuclear weapon states were therefore only willing to negotiate about a solution that made a 
fundamental distinction between those states that had already acquired nuclear weapons, and 
those that had not.52 Subsequently, in 1965 the General Assembly adopted a resolution defining 
five principles on which a treaty should be based.53 Because the United States and its allies 
disagreed with the Soviet Union and its allies on major points, it took several years before the 
                                                 
46 Federation of American Scientists (2007) 
47 General Assembly Resolution 1665 (1961)  
48 Diehl and Moltz (2008:14) 
49 Nye (2005:146) 
50 Johnson (2003) 
51 Sagan and Waltz (2003), Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (2001:344-397) 
52 Persbo (2001:3) 
53 General Assembly Resolution 2028 (1965) 
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General Assembly adopted a resolution by which it commended the NPT and expressed the hope 
for the widest possible adherence to it.54 When those differences were resolved, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, working together, negotiated with the non-aligned members to produce a 
final treaty draft.55 The draft was eventually accepted by almost all states and the NPT was 
opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1967. The NPT entered into 
force on March 5, 1970. 
 
Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, the number of nuclear powers has risen to nine.56 
According to George Bunn, this number would have been much higher without the NPT.57 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons as a result of the 
NPT and related efforts.58 Moreover, many states that had research programs geared toward 
learning how to make nuclear weapons joined the NPT and thereby put aside their ambitions.59 
The treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995,60 and all but India, Pakistan and the DPRK have 
signed it. Today, the NPT constitutes the backbone of an international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime.61 
 
2.2. The Non-proliferation treaty 
The NPT consists of a series of mutually reinforcing and legally binding obligations and 
commitments pertaining to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These obligations 
                                                 
54 General Assembly Resolution 2373 (1968) 
55 Bunn (2006:76-77) 
56 The nine nuclear powers are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the PRC, Israel, India, 
Pakistan and the DPRK. Also Israel officially denies any nuclear weapon capability, it is believed to have completed 
its program and deployed nuclear weapons during the late 1960s (Diehl and Moltz, 2008:14). India conducted its first 
nuclear test explosion on May 18, 1974 at Pokhran in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. It later confirmed its nuclear 
capability by conducting a series of tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. These were followed by Pakistan testing its first 
nuclear weapon on May 28, 1998 in Chagai. The DPRK, the most recent state to do so, conducted a nuclear test on 
October 9, 2006. 
57 Bunn (2005) 
58 Although South Africa joined the NPT as a NNWS in 1991, it was later revealed that it had built and destroyed up 
to seven nuclear weapons (Diehl and Moltz, 2008). Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine relinquished control of nuclear 
weapons left on their territory in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, transferring them to the 
Russian Federation, and joined the NPT as NNWSs (Krepon and Scheinman, 2001:626). 
59 These include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and probably a number of other 
states that did not reveal their interest in nuclear weapons (Bunn, 2006:94-96). 
60 Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference “Extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons”  
61 van Dassen and Mærli (2007:16) 
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are accompanied by a system of international safeguards and an assurance on the right to peaceful 
use nuclear technology. The Preamble of the NPT sets out two fundamental principles concerning 
the application of the treaty.62 Firstly, it acknowledges that the existence of nuclear weapons 
threatens humankind, and ascertains that nuclear weapons should not be proliferated, but be 
abolished. This means that the NPT identifies all nuclear weapons and any nuclear proliferation 
as a threat, regardless of who controls them and to whom or within which entity they proliferate. 
Secondly, the Preamble states that the peaceful application of nuclear energy should be available 
to all parties of the treaty. 
 
However, as described in the previous chapter section, the negotiations leading up to the NPT 
were marked by the reality that some states possessed nuclear weapons, while others did not, and 
that those possessing nuclear weapons relied heavily on them for their national security. 
Although all states parties to the NPT in principal are equal, the NPT accepted this discriminatory 
reality by formally dividing states parties into two groups: NWSs and NNWSs. The main 
obligation of the NWSs is not to transfer ownership or control to “any recipient whatsoever” of 
nuclear weapons directly or indirectly (Article I of the NPT). The phrase “any recipient 
whatsoever” includes not only states, but also non-state entities.63  
 
The main obligation of the NNWSs, on the other hand, is not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to 
seek or receive assistance in making them (Article II). According to George Bunn, one of the 
negotiators of the NPT, this provision was as important for many NNWSs as it was for the NWSs 
because it was a commitment to neighbouring and rivalling states.64 In order to verify that the 
NNWSs fulfil their obligation, they are obligated to submit their nuclear activities to international 
safeguards (Article III.1). Safeguards include requirements and standards for inspections of their 
nuclear activities, such as research and power generators, to ensure that nuclear material and 
technology are not diverted to make weapons.65 
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65 The verification functions are performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an 
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All states parties, NWSs and NNWSs alike, are obligated not to provide nuclear related 
equipment or material unless the items are subjected to safeguards (Article III.2).66 As first set 
out in the Preamble of the NPT, Article IV reaffirms the “inalienable right” of all parties to the 
treaty to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II. It also obligates all parties to facilitate the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. Further, Article V obligates all signatories to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosives will be made 
available to the NNWSs parties to the NPT on a non-discriminatory basis.67 The undertaking by 
the states parties to prevent horizontal proliferation, as set out in Articles I-III, corresponds to an 
obligation to prevent vertical proliferation and to negotiate on effective measures towards nuclear 
disarmament (Article VI). In addition to these obligations, each party also has the right to 
conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their 
respective territories (Article VII), to propose amendments to the treaty (Article VIII), and to 
withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of 
the treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of the state (Article X). “Extraordinary events” 
are not defined further, leaving it up to each party to decide whether such events have occurred.68 
 
2.3. The Bargain 
As illustrated by Table 1, there is an asymmetry between the obligations of the NWSs and the 
obligations of the NNWSs. Firstly, while the NNWSs are prohibited from acquiring nuclear 
weapons; the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWSs is temporarily tolerated. Secondly, 
only the NNWSs are obliged to place their nuclear facilities fully under international safeguards. 
The asymmetry in obligations relating to the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons is the 
                                                                                                                                                              
information than was previously required, and to request more intrusive physical access the nuclear activities of 
NNWS (Goldblat, 2007:16). However, the Additional Protocol is only slowly replacing the original safeguard 
requirements, and is yet not in effect in most states parties to the NPT (Bunn, 2005). As envisaged by the IAEA 
Statute (Article XII), cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements are to be reported to the UN Security 
Council (Goldblat, 2007:23). 
66 Guidelines for the implementation of Article III.2 are found in IAEA INFCIRC/209, which includes a list of 
materials and equipment which will not be exported without safeguards.   
67 To date no provision of nuclear explosion services have been sought or accrued, and Article V has subsequently 
been overtaken by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which, although not yet in force, 
prohibits nuclear explosions for both military and civilian purposes (Goldblat, 2007). 
68 Bunn (2006:78), Goldblat (2005) 
   
 24 
most striking. Giving up weapons which at the time of negotiation were touted as the ultimate 
security guarantee was certainly not an easy decision for any state.69 Moreover, forsaking nuclear 
weapons despite the fact that other states had already acquired such weapons and would be 
allowed to hold on to them for an unforeseeable time, thus wielding unprecedented power to 
bring down destruction on any NNWS, seems truly extraordinary.70  
 




Nuclear weapons temporarily tolerated Not acquire nuclear weapons 
Not transfer ownership or control of nuclear weapons Not accept transfer of ownership or control of nuclear 
weapons 
Not subjected to international control Submit nuclear activities to international safeguards 
Not provide nuclear related items unless the items are 
subjected to safeguards 
Not provide nuclear related items unless the items are 
subjected to safeguards 
Facilitate exchange of peaceful nuclear technology Facilitate exchange of peaceful nuclear technology 
Negotiate secession of arms race and nuclear 
disarmament 
Negotiate secession of arms race and nuclear 
disarmament 
 
In order to explain this asymmetry of obligations, scholars tend to view the NPT as the result of a 
bargaining process in which the NNWSs gained benefits and concessions which made it 
worthwhile to tolerate the treaty.72 In exchange for foregoing nuclear weapons and submitting to 
safeguards, as illustrated by Table 2, the NNWSs were promised support to enable them to 
benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which became Article IV, and negotiations on 
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71 The provision to ensure availability of potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions has not been included in 
the table because it has been annulled by the CTBT. 
72 Miller (2007), Blix (2008:44) 
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Table 2: The NPT Bargain 
NNWSs NWSs 
Promised to forsake nuclear weapons Promised access to nuclear technology and cooperation 
on the application of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes 
Promised to submit to international safeguards Promised “good faith” negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament 
 
The provisions to facilitate the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology and to undertake 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament are in the NPT referred to as obligations of both the NWSs 
and the NNWSs. However, it can be argued that these obligations first and foremost fall upon the 
NWSs. Because NNWSs per definition do not have nuclear weapons, the obligation to disarm 
rests primarily on the NWS. Similarly, the obligation to facilitate the exchange of peaceful 
nuclear technology rests, at least at the time of negotiation, more heavily on the NWSs because 
they arguably have made more progress in the nuclear field than most NNWSs. Article IV 
explicitly states that “parties to the treaty in a position to do so” carry a special obligation in this 
regard. Also the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is 
to take place “especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty”. That 
access to and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy served as an incentive for NNWSs 
to accept the NPT is also illustrated by Article V. Although the prevailing opinion today is that 
the peaceful use of nuclear explosives would entail more risks than benefits, at the time of the 
negotiation there were hopes that the economic benefits from the use of peaceful nuclear 
explosives might turn out to be impressive. Article V was included in the treaty because the 
NNWSs did not want to forsake these.74  
 
Without this bargain there would have been no treaty,75 and it continues to be relied upon as a 
load-bearing component of the NPT.76 However, Article VI, in which the commitment to nuclear 
disarmament is pertained, is not as straightforward, and has proved to be the most controversial 
article of the NPT. Persistent and bitter disagreement about the meaning of Article VI has been 
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central in the history of the NPT.77 The following chapter sections therefore deals with Article VI 
in more detail. 
 
2.3.1. Article VI: the obligation to disarm 
Article VI consists of a single equivocal sentence: “Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective control.” The vagueness of Article VI makes it difficult to draw any 
specified legal conclusions of its content. Even though the article gives rise to an obligation to 
pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament, views differ on the precise application of it. While 
the NWSs have argued that the obligation presupposes a reduction of conventional arms before a 
reduction of nuclear weapons is conceivable, the NNWSs often interpret the obligation as one to 
commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament independently from negotiations on general and 
complete disarmament, preferably within a specified timeframe.78 In this chapter section I will try 
to clarify the meaning of Article VI. 
 
Article VI explicitly refers to negotiation in “good faith” on matters relating to vertical non-
proliferation and disarmament. “Good faith” is a recognised general principle of law and as such 
a formal source of international law.79 It is an obligation which is widely considered to be central 
to the entire notion of treaty law and an essential predicate to the effective conduct of 
international affairs. According to Andreas Persbo, a consistent application of the principle 
should negate unintended and literal interpretations of texts that lead to one party gaining an 
unfair or unjust advantage over another party.80 Good faith negotiations are to be conducted so 
that they are meaningful to all parties. Abnormal delays cannot be tolerated if negotiations are to 
be conducted in accordance with the principle of good faith.81 Hence, the omission of a specific 
                                                 
77 Miller (2007:51) 
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79 The principle of good faith is set forth in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter, reflected in the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States, and the Final Act of 
the 1975 Helsinki Conference, as well as embodied in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of 
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reference to a time frame for the attainment of the primary goal of Article VI does not mean that 
negotiations can be prolonged forever. 
 
To determine the limits of the legal obligation referring to nuclear disarmament, it is helpful to 
take into consideration the NPT review process. Article VIII of the NPT provides for a 
conference of parties to the treaty to be held five years after the entry into force of the NPT and 
further conferences at intervals of five years thereafter to review the operation and realisation of 
the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty.82 Although the NWSs and the 
NNWSs have tended to hold different views on the meaning of Article VI, the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference produced on the basis of consensus a document called “Principles and 
Objectives for Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament.”83 In its preamble this document 
explicitly emphasises “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” as a goal of the NPT. The 
2000 NPT Review Conference operationalised the document and agreed on a list of practical 
steps to ensure systematic and progressive efforts aiming at the full implementation of Article VI. 
One of the steps is the “unequivocal undertaking by the NWSs to accomplish the total elimination 
of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all states parties are committed 
under Article VI.”84 This formulation makes no reference to Article VI as a mere obligation to 
negotiate on nuclear disarmament; rather the formulation implies that the obligation also 
encompasses a specific and concrete result of these negotiations, namely the total elimination of 
all nuclear arsenals.85 The wording also implies that the 2000 NPT Review Conference de-linked 
the issue of nuclear disarmament from the issue of general and complete disarmament. Although 
review conferences lack decision-making powers,86 under Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
                                                 
82 To date, seven review conferences have been held between 1975 and 2005. The next review conference is 
scheduled for 2010. 
83 The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference resulted in three decisions and a resolution that the parties 
heralded as a “package deal” (Rydell, 2005). First, the NPT was extended indefinitely, ensuring that its commitments 
to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are permanent obligations. Second, an enhanced review mechanism 
was created. Third, the parties agreed to a set of principles and objectives for assessing progress in nuclear non-
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which endorsed the creation of a Middle Eastern nuclear weapons-free zone. Certain positive steps by the NWSs 
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support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), likely contributed to the successful outcome (Rydell, 
2005). 
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Convention on the Law of the Treaties, it is arguable that documents emerging from NPT review 
conferences constitute “subsequent agreements” and “supplementary interpretations” that are as 
authoritative as the NPT text itself.87 
 
Other events have also shed light on the obligation of the NWSs to abolish their nuclear arsenals. 
On July 8, 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), after a request by the UN General 
Assembly, issued a non-binding advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.” The Advisory Opinion deals primarily with those issues, but also covers the 
obligation of the NWSs to disarm their nuclear arsenals. The Advisory Opinion unanimously 
states that the obligation pertained in Article VI goes beyond that of a mere obligation of 
conduct; it is an obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the precise result of 
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.88 
 
In sum, the obligation under international law to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an agreement, the conclusion of the ICJ in its advisory opinion, the reaffirmation by the NWSs of 
their commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament during the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and 
the pledge to get rid of nuclear weapons during the 2000 NPT Review Conference, provides 
strong evidence that Article VI encompasses a “zero solution,” and that any decision to keep on 
to a few, even a single, warhead for a indefinite future represents a breach of the NPT.89 
However, the interpretation of Article VI is not simply a narrow and technical legal matter. 
Nuclear disarmament is considered to be an issue of fundamental importance for many NNWSs 
and has over the years come to be widely accepted as a central obligation of the NWS.90 
Although the NWSs tend to disagree with the NNWSs on the meaning of Article VI, they 
understand that it would be politically incendiary to question or reject the article.91 Thus, Article 
VI has importance and relevance, if not undisputed legal force, and continues to be relied upon as 
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a load-bearing component in the set of bargains that constitutes the NPT.92 This is a political 
reality that affects the commitment of the NNWSs to the treaty.93 
 
2.4. The viability of the treaty 
Despite its accomplishments, the viability of the NPT is not guaranteed.94 According to Morten 
Bremer Mærli and Sverre Lodgaard, the NPT is exposed to pressure 1) from above, 2) from 
within, 3) from outside, 4) as well as pressures from below.95 As illustrated by Table 3, each 
category of pressure derives from a different category of actor and refers to a different type of 
challenge which may undermine the NPT. Although the concept of pressures is a simplification, 
it is a useful tool to illustrate and analyse the various challenges the NPT faces. The different 
pressures can relate to each other and can form clusters. The following chapter sections discuss 
each pressure in more detail. 
 
Table 3: Pressures on the NPT 
Pressure from Refers to 
 
Derives from 
Above The failure to disarm NWSs 
Within Deliberate manipulation or violation of the treaty 
obligation to forsake nuclear weapons 
NNWSs 
Outside States operating outside the NPT Non-signatories 
Below The non-state paradigm Non-state actors 
 
2.4.1. Pressure from above 
“Pressure from above” refers to the failure of complying with Article VI of the NPT. As argued 
in chapter 2.3, the obligation to make progress on nuclear disarmament rests primarily with the 
NWSs. This obligation is an important part of the bargain on which the NPT is based. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the injured parties can “suspend the 
operation of the treaty in whole or in part or terminate it,” if one party to the treaty is found 
materially breaching the treaty.96 Moreover, following that the NPT can be understood as a 
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bargain between the NWSs and the NNWSs, the importance of nuclear disarmament has arguably 
increased with the declined attractiveness of Article IV, which has served as an important 
incentive for NNWSs to accept the asymmetry of rights and obligations in the NPT.  
 
When the NPT was negotiated, nuclear energy appeared to offer a relatively cheap, safe and 
environmentally clean energy resource. This has failed to materialise due to several downsides of 
nuclear energy, such as radioactive waste and safety concerns.97 Although the global climate 
crisis and increased need for energy appears to lead to a renaissance in the use of nuclear energy 
in some states, many states retain their dismissal of nuclear energy.98 In addition, today the 
division between those states parties to the NPT which are eligible to receive assistance for the 
development of peaceful nuclear applications and states that are obliged to render this assistance, 
does not follow the division between NWSs and NNWSs as clearly as it did at the time of the 
negotiation of the NPT.99 Several NNWSs, such as Germany and Japan, have today reached a 
position where they are obligated to facilitate the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology on 
similar footing as the NWSs. The obligation to disarm, on the other hand, still first and foremost 
falls upon the NWSs. That the obligation to facilitate peaceful use of nuclear technology has been 
more evenly distributed between NWSs and NNWSs arguably suggest that it is even more 
important that the NWSs make progress towards nuclear disarmament in order for the NNWSs to 
submit to a discriminatory treaty. In light of these drawbacks, Article IV is not as effective an 
incentive to hold on to states parties as it once was. 
 
More importantly, the fulfilment of Article VI is important because it implies that the 
discriminating differentiation of nuclear weapon “haves” and “have-nots” will not be 
indefinitely.100 As discussed in chapter 2.3, it is truly extraordinary that the NNWSs submitted 
themselves to a treaty which in theory rendered their national security and possibly their very 
existence at the mercy of the NWSs. The discriminatory bifurcation has in itself been a source of 
vexation for many NNWSs. Indications of the rising tide of anger of the NNWSs with regard to 
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nuclear disarmament can be traces back in the voting behaviour on UN resolutions.101 This 
dissatisfaction has a corrosive effect on the NPT.102 Even if NNWSs do not withdraw from the 
NPT, effective management of the NPT regime requires cooperation between NWSs and 
NNWSs. Successful responses to nuclear proliferation challenges and crises, serious enforcement 
in the face of transgressions and further refinements to improve the NPT-regime all depend on 
the agreement, support and active participation of both NWSs and NNWSs.103 Such cooperation 
is difficult to achieve when there is frustration, distrust and allegation of bad faith against the 
NWSs over nuclear disarmament.104 
 
Further, in addition to undermining the NPT, the failure to disarm may also damage the very 
objective of the NPT itself. Not only may it be difficult to sustain the argument that proliferation 
of nuclear weapons is bad when the NWSs proclaim that their nuclear arsenals are essential to 
their national security, a claim that lost much of its leverage when the Cold War ended, but many 
scholars agree that, although the causes of proliferation are complex and not fully understood, the 
possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a powerful incentive for states to acquire nuclear 
weapons.105 According to Jonathan Schell, almost all states which have acquired nuclear 
weapons, starting with the Soviet Union, have pointed to an existing arsenal as their motive.106 
From the perspective of these states they respond to what they consider a threat to their national 
security by acquiring nuclear weapons themselves in order to deter the opponent state from using 
its nuclear weapons with impunity. These claims are supported by the findings of the Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Committee, which concludes that as long as any state possesses nuclear 
weapons, others will want them.107 Hence, the linkage between nuclear weapon possession and 
proliferation implies that non-proliferation and disarmament must go hand in hand.108 The 
importance of this linkage was acknowledged in 1995, when, in an attempt to reassure the 
NNWSs that they did not need to acquire nuclear weapons, the NWSs made non-treaty negative 
security assurances before the Security Council of the United Nations as part of the consideration 
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paid to the NNWSs in order to persuade them to vote for the extension of the NPT, as it was 
about to expire that year.109 However, the security assurances were not without exceptions, and 
their legality and believability is unclear.110 Its reassurance to all of the NNWSs is therefore 
uncertain. Only nuclear disarmament would remove this incentive to opt for nuclear weapons. 
 
2.4.2. Pressure from within 
“Pressure from within” refers to NNWSs parties to the NPT which deliberately violate their 
treaty obligation to forsake nuclear weapons. States parties which have yet not concluded 
safeguards agreements also belong to this type of pressure.111 “Pressure from within” stems in 
part from a paradox embedded in the NPT: Under the NPT, the NNWSs agreed to give up their 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, but not their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to 
Article IV, it is the inalienable right of all states parties to develop and use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. Moreover, Article IV guarantees NNWSs the right to full access to nuclear 
power technology, on condition that they submit their nuclear activities to international 
inspections. According to Jonathan Schell, this bargain was a “Trojan horse” written into the text 
of the NPT.112 Nuclear technology is a dual-use technology with both civilian and military 
applications. Education, experience, materials and technology involved in making nuclear 
weapons can be drawn in large part by peaceful applications of nuclear energy.113 The NPT 
clearly prohibits NNWSs from using nuclear technology to make nuclear weapons, but once they 
have it, they have taken a major step towards the development of nuclear weapons.114 For 
NNWSs which desire nuclear weapons, Article IV thus assures that they are be able to acquire 
most of the wherewithal to fulfil their ambitions without violating the NPT.115 Hence, the number 
of states capable of building nuclear weapons has paradoxically increased due to the NPT. 
According to David Santoro, this paradox can prove to be the Achilles heel of the NPT.116 
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NNWSs which work within the NPT, but deliberately manipulate or violate the provisions of the 
treaty, such as Iran is suspected to do, may cause states parties, both NWSs and NNWSs, to loose 
confidence in the credibility of the NPT, and opt for other means to prevent proliferation.117  
 
Moreover, following the linkage between nuclear weapon arsenals and proliferation, as argued in 
the previous chapter section (2.4.1), if a NNWS acquires nuclear weapons it may again cause 
other NNWSs to acquire nuclear weapons as well, thus creating a negative spiral of 
proliferation.118 In order to manage “pressure from within,” several scholars argue that the 1997 
Additional Safeguards Protocol should be established as the new verification form in order to 
improve early detection of treaty violations.119 The standards and requirements for inspection 
negotiated in the early 1970s were shown inadequate by Iraq’s success in hiding its nuclear 
weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War in 1991.120 Further, better enforcement 
mechanisms need to be put in place in order to deter and respond to treaty violations. This would 
require radical changes in the structure and working of the United Nations as well as the IAEA.121 
The weakness of the current enforcement mechanism has been illustrated by the case of the 
DPRK, which refused international inspections of certain suspect facilities without provoking 
immediate and effective sanctions.122 However, as long as there are strong incentives to acquire 
nuclear weapons, controlling the supply and use of nuclear technology can be effective only to 
some degree.123 Acknowledging that nuclear arsenals can pose a strong incentive for some 
NNWSs to seek nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament thus also plays an important role in 
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2.4.3. Pressure from outside 
“Pressure from outside” refers to the stress put on the NPT by non-signatories. To date, these 
include Israel, India and Pakistan.124 The failure to achieve universality undermines not only the 
normative strength of the treaty and the regime that it anchors, but also its ability to control 
proliferation.125 The importance of universality is that it would bring proliferation challenges 
inside the non-proliferation regime, challenges becoming matters of compliance. Universality 
would also raise the costs of non-compliance by increasing the likelihood of collective 
enforcement of treaty obligations. “Pressure from outside” is enhanced by the fact that India, 
Pakistan, and Israel are DNWSs. Acknowledging that possession and proliferation are 
inextricably linked (see chapter 2.4.1), the nuclear arsenals of Israel, India, and Pakistan not only 
serve as potential motives for some NNWSs to acquire nuclear weapons, but also as a 
justification for the NWSs to hold on to their arsenals.  
 
However, the NPT recognises five NWSs only. Any state may join the treaty after it entry into 
force, but must accede to it as a NNWS.126 Thus, in order to join the NPT, Israel, India, and 
Pakistan would have to dismantle their nuclear arsenals. According to most analysts, this is an 
unrealistic scenario.127 To formalise the status Israel, India, and Pakistan as NWSs, and submit 
them to the same obligation to nuclear disarmament, could on the other hand be seen as 
rewarding imprudent behaviour. It would also be difficult to achieve because it would require 
amending the NPT, an action requiring consensus among all states parties.128 Moreover, some 
states joined the treaty on the understanding that there would be only five NWSs.129 Japan and 
other states have indicated that they may reconsider their non-nuclear status because the 
recognition of additional NWSs would upset their security calculations.130 However, stubbornly 
holding on to the question of formality, demanding that the three non-signatories give up their 
nuclear arsenals, has so far been fruitless. Accepting that Israel, India and Pakistan have in effect 
been nuclear weapon powers for a long time, several analysts therefore argue that it is important 
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to bring the non-signatories into the NPT “as if” they were parties to the treaty, giving them some 
form of recognition in return for their adopting and fulfilling obligations that apply to the 
NWSs.131 However, to do so requires that the NWSs take their obligation to disarm seriously. 
Just as the nuclear arsenals of the DNWSs can serve as an incentive for some NNWSs to acquire 
nuclear weapons, as well as a justification to be used by the NWSs to hold on to their nuclear 
weapons, so can the nuclear arsenals of the NWSs serve as an incentive for and be used as a 
justification by the DNWSs to hold on to their nuclear weapons. India especially has crusaded 
against the NPT as a discriminatory treaty that fails to move the world towards nuclear 
disarmament.132 Nuclear disarmament is thus crucial to rallying international opinion against all 
proliferation, as well as states that attempt to remain outside the NPT.133 
 
Moreover, if states withdraw from the NPT, their number would arguably add to the “pressure 
from outside.” Although many states consider the right to withdraw from a treaty as a norm of 
international law, the abrupt termination of a multilateral arms control treaty such as the NPT 
may directly affect the security of many or all parties.134 As noted in the previous chapter section 
(2.4.2), the NPT has structural flaws, which means that a state can move to the brink of nuclear 
weapons capacity, thereby giving it the option to develop nuclear weapons quickly if it should 
decide to withdraw, without violating the treaty. Although its formal nuclear status is still 
unclear, the utilisation of the withdrawal provision of Article X by the DPRK illustrates this 
point. This has led several scholars to argue that in order to ensure the survival of the NPT, no 
state should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty.135 The case of the DPRK also illustrates that 
different types of pressure can form clusters. The DPRK constitutes both “pressure from within,” 
by having acquired nuclear weapons despite its obligation as a NNWS not to do so, and arguably 
“pressure from outside,” by utilising the withdrawal provision of the NPT. 
 
2.4.4. Pressure from below 
“Pressure from below” is posed by non-state actors. As William Potter notes, fissile materials, 
nuclear weapons and crude type nuclear explosives are also within reach of non-state actors, 
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which can play the role as suppliers, middlemen and end-users.136 The principle practical barrier 
to the creating of nuclear weapons remains the acquisition of weapon usable nuclear material.137 
If they first acquired the necessary nuclear materials, well-organised sub-state organisations and 
terrorist groups with adequate time and resources could produce a nuclear explosive device.138 
Except declaring that NWSs are prohibited from providing nuclear weapons to “any recipient 
whatsoever,” the NPT does not safeguard against the acquisition of nuclear materials or nuclear 
weapons by non-state entities.139 Although the prospect of a nuclear warhead being stolen seems 
unlikely, it cannot be ruled out. A more likely scenario is that a terrorist group could acquire 
nuclear explosive material or radioactive sources.140 In order to prevent non-state proliferation, it 
is critical to keep fissile material under control and accountable. IAEA safeguards do so in 
NNWSs. However, the paradoxical exemption of the NWSs from international stockpile control, 
which leaves vast quantities of fissile material unaccounted for, increases the likelihood of such a 
scenario occurring.141 Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent 
deterioration in security in its nuclear complex has increased the risk that “loose nukes” could 
find their way to the black market for sale to aspiring nuclear powers and terrorists groups.142 The 
attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that non-state actors are willing to inflict mass casualties. 
Terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have already shown an interest in acquiring nuclear 
weapons.143 This apparent increase in both supply and demand suggest that “pressure from 
below” has gained weight.144 In order to fill this gap in the NPT, the UN Security Council on 
April 28, 2004 adopted Resolution 1540.145 Resolution 1540 acts like an “amendment” to the 
NPT, and requires states to adopt national criminal laws and physical security measures to protect 
their nuclear material, equipment and technology from theft and sabotage.146 
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Moreover, several scholars argue that in addition to enhance the security of nuclear weapons and 
fissile material, also the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals is important in order to 
prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons.147 This view has also recently been 
supported by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, which argue that 
the reliance on nuclear weapons for national security is becoming increasingly hazardous because 
non-state terrorists are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy.148 Thus, fulfilling 




The NPT ascertains that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to 
obtain them, and that states that possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons. By 
dividing states parties into NWSs and NNWSs, the NPT froze an arbitrary historical moment. 
Although the discriminatory differentiation was not intended to be indefinitely, it created a need 
to compensate the deprived group because the NNWSs submitted themselves to a unique 
discriminatory setting, in which they, in theory, could become nuclear targets at any time.149 The 
obligation to disarm, embedded in Article VI, was therefore a decisive factor in their choice to 
join the NPT. In addition to the promise of nuclear disarmament, the need to compensate was 
filled by guaranteeing NNWSs the right to full nuclear power technology, on condition that they 
submit their facilities to international inspections. This bargain constitutes the basis of the NPT. It 
created a balance of interests between NWSs and NNWSs. Without it, there would have been no 
agreement. Thus, it has to be upheld and reconfirmed in order for the NPT to survive. 
 
The NPT is exposed to pressure from several directions; from “above,” from “within,” from 
“outside,” and from “below.” Of the four types of pressure, “pressure from above” and “pressure 
from within” appear most severe. They relate to the bargain on which the NPT is based and 
derive from states parties to the treaty. “Pressure from above” derives from the NWSs, and 
pressure from within derives from NNWSs. Being a NWSs, U.S. nuclear weapons policy has an 
impact on “pressure from above.” “Pressure from above” is constituted by the failure to make 
                                                 
147 Lodgaard (2007:308), Potter (2007:206-208) 
148 Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn (2007) 
149 Miller (2007) 
   
 38 
progress on nuclear disarmament. Not only do several events prove strong evidence that holding 
on to nuclear weapons for an indefinite future represents a breach of the NPT, but the obligation 
to disarm is a political reality that affects the commitment of NNWSs to the treaty. The failure to 
make progress on the obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals may cause the non-proliferation 
bargain upon which the NPT rests, to cease to bear its load. Failure to do so would not only make 
cooperation difficult by causing frustration and distrust, but is also an important incentive for 
NNWSs to stay with the NPT. The importance of this incentive is further increased by the fact 
that access to nuclear technology is no longer considered as strong an incentive for many NNWSs 
to stay with NPT as it was at the time of the negotiation of the treaty. 
 
Moreover, nuclear disarmament is not only important because the failure to do so constitutes a 
direct pressure by itself, but also because nuclear disarmament indirectly affects pressure from 
other directions. “Pressure from within” stems in part from the fact that access to nuclear 
technology, as guaranteed by the NPT, can be used not only for peaceful purposes, but to build 
nuclear weapons. NNWSs which deliberately manipulate or violate the provisions of the treaty 
may cause states parties to the NPT to loose confidence in the ability of the treaty to stem nuclear 
proliferation. Acknowledging that the existence of nuclear arsenals can pose a strong incentive 
for NNWSs to seek nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament is important to ease the demand side 
of “pressure from within.” As long as there are strong incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, 
controlling the supply and use of nuclear technology can be effective only to a degree. “Pressure 
from outside” derives from the three DNWSs, operating outside the NPT. Because some of the 
non-signatories see the NPT as a discriminatory treaty which ascertains nuclear possession by the 
five NWSs while keeping other states out of the nuclear club, nuclear disarmament would put 
pressure on the DNWSs to rid themselves of their nuclear weapons too. Moreover, if states 
withdraw from the NPT, “pressure from outside” would increase. By committing themselves to 
the disarmament obligation, the NWSs can prevent this from happening. “Pressure from below” 
refers to non-state entities which can play the role as suppliers, middle-men and end-users of 
nuclear weapons and crude type nuclear explosive devices. Fulfilling the obligation to disarm 
nuclear arsenals constitutes a long term strategy to capture and avert the risk of non-state 
proliferation. 
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3. Methodology 
Different research questions require different methods to answer them.150 This chapter accounts 
for how the research study has been planned and executed, addresses challenges faced during the 
research process, and briefly reflects on how personal opinions and preferences may have 
affected the research findings. 
 
3.1. Research design 
Disarmament is the key venue for assessing U.S. impact on the viability of the NPT.151 Following 
this acknowledgement, analysing the extent to which the United States lives up to its obligation 
to disarm should indicate whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy is compatible with a strong and 
effective NPT. However, nuclear disarmament is an abstract concept, and thus difficult to 
operationalise. As noted in chapter 2.3.1, Article VI of the NPT, in which the obligation to disarm 
is pertained, does not set out any criteria or timeframe by which to judge its fulfilment. This 
makes it difficult to draw any specified conclusions on whether U.S. nuclear policy is compatible 
with nuclear disarmament. 
 
Reviewing the implementation of the treaty since its indefinite extension in 1995, the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference agreed by consensus on a series of measures to promote the full 
implementation of the NPT, including Article VI. In paragraph 15 of the discussion of Article VI, 
the Review Conference declared that it “agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic 
and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” and set forth a list of eighteen such practical steps.152 These steps, commonly referred 
to simply as “the Thirteen Steps,”153 are based on Paragraph 4 and 4c of the 1995 “Decision on 
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” one of the elements 
of the “package” introduced in conjunction with the indefinite extension of the NPT.154 The steps 
                                                 
150 Punch (2001) 
151 Miller (2007) 
152 Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference 
153 Step 9 of the thirteen steps consists of six individual steps, making up for a total of eighteen steps (see chapter 4). 
154 The 1995 NPT Review Conference made three decisions: 1) strengthening the review conference of the treaty, 2) 
agreeing on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and 3) extending the NPT. In 
addition, the conference agreed on a Resolution on the Middle East, calling for the establishment of a nuclear 
weapon free zone in the Middle East (Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference). 
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are controversial, but can form a valuable methodological platform because they operationalise 
Article VI and are possible to monitor over time. 
 
The agreement upon the Thirteen Steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference was the first time 
that the NWSs accepted references to specific measures which can be acted upon for nuclear 
disarmament leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.155 The steps make the abstract notion 
of nuclear disarmament observable and measurable. By assessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy in 
relation to each of the Thirteen Steps over time, the research questions formulated may be 
answered. If there is a tendency of compatibility between U.S. nuclear weapons policy and the 
Thirteen Steps, it would suggest that U.S. nuclear weapons policy underpins the NPT. If, on the 
other hand, the findings uncover a tendency of incompatibility between U.S. nuclear policy and 
the Thirteen Steps, it would indicate that the nuclear weapons policy of the United States is 
detrimental to the NPT. 
 
However, the implementation of the Thirteen Steps should not be utilised uncritically for 
assessing U.S. nuclear policy. The United States has dismissed the Thirteen Steps as not legally 
binding, claiming that the documents produced at review conferences do not have the same legal 
standing as the NPT itself.156 Moreover, as Christopher Ford, United States Special 
Representative for Nuclear Non-Proliferation within the U.S. State Department, points out, the 
Thirteen Steps by their own terms in no way claim to be an exclusive list of the ways in which 
states parties to the NPT can satisfy their Article VI obligations.157 Thus, Ford argues, it is 
difficult to assert that a state’s lack of commitment to all of the Thirteen Steps indicates non-
compliance. 
 
From a juridical perspective, Ford may have a point. However, as argued in chapter 2.3.1, there is 
both a legal and political dimension to the obligation to disarm. It is not the intention of this 
thesis to make a legal judgement on whether the United States is violating its treaty obligations, 
but to assess the impact of U.S. nuclear weapons policy on the viability of the NPT. For this 
purpose, the degree of fulfilment of the Thirteen Steps seems relevant. The Thirteen Steps are a 
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direct result of the “package” introduced to extend the NPT in 1995. They where agreed upon by 
consensus, and reflect the expectations of all states parties to the NPT. Like Article VI itself, the 
Thirteen Steps hence have importance and relevance, if not undisputed legal force. The extent to 
which they are respected and fulfilled affects the strength and efficiency of the NPT. Whether 
U.S. policy is in conformity with the Thirteen Steps says something about the willingness of the 
United States to live up to the bargain on which the NPT and its extension are based, and thus 
whether U.S. policy has a beneficial or detrimental impact on the viability of the treaty. 
Additional measures benefiting the process of nuclear disarmament are certainly welcomed, but 
such measures should not replace those collectively agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference. 
 
In sum, the Thirteen Steps are well suited to answer the research questions. The steps are 
measurable and possible to assess over time. The extent to which U.S. nuclear weapons policy is 
compatible with the Thirteen Steps suggests whether the United States is perceived to be 
fulfilling its commitment to nuclear disarm, and hence whether, and in what ways, U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy is compatible with a strong and effective NPT (research question 1 and 2). 
Shedding light on these issues further makes it possible to reflect on whether U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy needs to change in order to align with the NPT (research question 3). 
 
3.2. Data sources 
Using the Thirteen Steps to assess U.S. impact on the NPT means that U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy which relates to the Thirteen Steps is identified as data. U.S. compliance with the Thirteen 
Steps has been quite thoroughly investigated.158 Moreover, the United States is probably the 
NWSs which provides the most accesible information about its nuclear weapons policy.159 Unless 
information can be lawfully withheld under specific exemptions, the 1966 Freedom of 
Information Act allows for the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased information and 
documents controlled by the U.S. government.160  
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I relied heavily on websites to find data.161 Websites are rich sources of updated information, 
analyses and original documents. The types of websites I used can be divided into three main 
categories: 1) U.S. governmental websites, such as the homepages of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA),162 2) inter-governmental websites provided by relevant 
international organisations, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, and 3) non-governmental websites such as the homepages of the 
Federation of American Scientists.163 
 
In order to maximise the quality of the data, I attempted to check the reliability164 of the websites 
prior to using them as data sources.165 I considered U.S. governmental and the relevant inter-
governmental websites as reliable information providers – though with a potential bias. The 
reliability of non-governmental sources, on the other hand, is more uncertain because they may 
not have access to all relevant information. Thus, I chose to limit my non-governmental sources 
to well-established and well-known sources. The list of such particular websites provided by 
Sarah Diehl and James Clay Moltz in their introductury book “Nuclear Weapons and 
Nonproliferation” (2008) served as a helpful starting point in this regard. I further ascertained the 
reliability of websites by searching for duplicate information in books and other written sources, 
such as the peer-reviewed Nonproliferation Review. In that way I was able to crosscheck 
information, noticing which sites apparently presented the most reliable information. In order to 
check that the information was consistent, I used several reliable sources from different 
categories of websites, as well as books, whenever that was possible. Finding the same data in 
several reputable sources was a good indication that the data was reliable. However, in order to 
                                                 
161 The sources I have used are referred to throughout the thesis and listed in the references at the end of the thesis. 
162 The NNSA was establised by Congress in 2000 as a separately organised agency within the U.S. Department of 
Energy. The NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
(http://nnsa.energy.gov). 
163 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a non-profit organization formed in 1945 by scientists from the 
Manhattan Project concerned about control of the technology they had helped create. Since its founding, FAS has 
focused on nuclear weapons, including monitoring U.S. nuclear weapons policy (www.fas.org). A source of 
information which I found especially helpful was the Nuclear Information Project, a public education project with 
the Federation of American Scientists that works to provide the public with access to declassified documents and 
analysis about nuclear weapons policy and operations.163 Since the Project’s web site was launched in March 2004, 
users of the information have included major research institutes and governments from around the world. Thus, 
although it was not always possible to cross-check the information provided by the Nuclear Information Project with 
official information, I consider the data provided by the Nuclear Information Project reliable. 
164 Reliability refers to the degree to which the findings of a study are independent of accidental circumstances of 
their production (Silverman, 2006:285). 
165 Punch (2001:257) 
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enhance the reliability of data through crosschecking, it is important that the different sources do 
not site each other. If that is the case, the entire purpose of crosschecking is undermined.  
 
Through the process of collecting data I found that U.S. governmental sources had a tendency to 
highlight positive aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, as could be expected, while sometimes 
leaving out aspects which could be interpreted negatively. Non-governmental sources, on the 
other hand, had a tendency to highlight negative aspects of U.S. nuclear policy. Moreover, 
although most information needed was readily available, some data were not available from 
governmental sources, but kept secret from the public due to national security concerns. Here I 
had to rely to a greater extent on non-governmental sources without the possibility of confirming 
the data by checking them with official sources. This especially concerns data relating to nuclear 
capabilities, such as the exact size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the amount of fissile materials 
in U.S. hands. In 1999 the United States decided to classify the number of nuclear warheads 
being dismantled, and the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile.166 The numbers of U.S. 
nuclear weapons used in the thesis are therefore estimates.167 
 
Similarly, due to classifications some data relating to U.S. nuclear war planning and strategy have 
not been possible to crosscheck with official information. Throughout the analysis I have in 
particular referred to the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a review of U.S. 
nuclear forces and official nuclear weapons policy, which is regularly enunciated by the U.S. 
government in a congressionally mandated nuclear posture review. The current NPR was 
prepared in 2001 by the Department of Defence (DOD) in close cooperation with the Department 
of Energy (DOE). Key findings of the NPR were presented to the Congress on January 8, 2002, 
and on January 9, 2002, the DOD held a press conference to present an executive summary of the 
NPR.168 Although the entire text of the NPR was kept classified, the Los Angeles Times and the 
New York Times revealed on March 9, 2002, that they had obtained the full document, and major 
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parts of its contents have been leaked and are available on the internet.169 The use of the NPR as 
data in this thesis is based on the special press briefing and the leaked excerpts.170 Although the 
source who revealed the classified parts of the NPR remains unknown,171 the leaked excerpts are 
considered to be reliable.172 
 
3.3. Managing subjectivity 
The research presented in this thesis is normative, which means that the study aims at finding out 
not only how U.S. nuclear weapons policy affects the viability of NPT, but also how U.S. nuclear 
policy should be in order to ensure a strong and effective NPT.173  Normative research is often 
differentiated from descriptive research, which aims at gathering knowledge about the object of 
study, but does not wish to modify it. For many scientists and observers of science a common 
response to normative research is to call for the research to be pure, or somehow separate from 
normative considerations.174 According to the positivist approach, all good science should be 
value free, unbiased and objective, revealing the one and only, unified, unambiguous truth.175 
Non-positivists on the other hand, argue that complete value-free, objective social science is 
impossible. According to them, the separation between fact and value is not clear in social 
sciences, and the researcher can thus not avoid taking stands on the issue being studied. On the 
contrary, social science proclaiming to be value-free can be used to hide values and agendas 
under a cloth of alleged objectivity. Thus, a researcher who is motivated by a strong moral desire 
to effect change need not invalidate good research practice, non-positivists argue. However, 
values and potential biases must be made explicit in order for the research to be legitimate.176 
 
My motive for conducting research on this particular subject started out as mere curiosity and 
interest. Why I chose to conduct research on the viability of the NPT and why I chose to focus 
my research on U.S. nuclear weapons policy has been explained in the introduction of the thesis 
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170 Throughout the thesis, both the press briefing and the excerpts are simply referred to as the 2002 NPR. 
171 Some scholars have argued that it was the Bush administration itself who leaked the excerpts in order to enhance 
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and/or intended to weaken the Bush administration (Robbins, 2002). 
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(chapter 1). I am not aware of having any predisposed positive or negative sentiments towards the 
United States, and as such consider myself competent and qualified to conduct this research. 
However, in the process of my research I have become aware that I am a nuclear pessimist. 
Although I do not reject the claim that nuclear weapons can induce some form of stability, I also 
believe that it can create instability. Moreover, I hold that the risks pertained in nuclear 
deterrence greatly overshadows the potential gains, as discussed in chapter 1.2. In addition, 
although I do not categorically oppose war, I believe that war must be controlled and restricted to 
a minimum.177 The potential violence nuclear weapons can convey is so enormous (see chapter 
1.4) that it seems meaningless to put restrictions on them. Taking my normative sentiments into 
consideration, it is important to reflect upon whether and possibly how these sentiments can 
affect the reliability of my research. 
 
Most of the Thirteen Steps used to assess the compatibility between U.S. nuclear weapons policy 
and nuclear disarmament are quite straightforward. However, a few of the steps are quite vague, 
leaving some room for different interpretations. Although I have tried to interpret each of the 
steps as rationally and precisely as possible, my normative sentiments may have influenced some 
of my interpretations. However, the purpose of the Thirteen Steps is to promote the 
implementation of Article VI of the NPT, which is biased against nuclear weapons. The NPT 








                                                 
177 War causes destruction, suffering and death. Moreover, the destructiveness of war does not end when the act of 
committing violence ceases. Suffering can continue long after war has come to an end. Loved ones remain dead or 
are missing, homes and infrastructure lie in ruins, diseases, starvation and malnutrition continue to take their toll, 
mines and unexploded ordinances make everyday life dangerous and continue to cripple and kill indiscriminately, 
and survivors may be traumatised for life. Violence has a strong psychologically essence. It causes distrust, hostility 
and hate between competing parties (Barash and Webel, 2002:58). Such attitudes and emotions do not simply go 
away when the war comes to an end. Memories of war are even passed on from generation to generation, generating 
resentment and vengefulness between people who themselves did not experience the war (Salomon and Nevo, 2002). 
Thus, war can destroy long after the direct violence itself has ended. 
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4. U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Thirteen Steps 
This chapter analyses U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Thirteen Steps. The Thirteen 
Steps in fact consist of 18 specific steps because Step 9 is made up of six separate steps. Of these 
eighteen steps, eight address all states parties to the NPT (Steps 1-5, and 11-13), eight are aimed 
exclusively at the NWSs (Steps 6, 9 a-f, and 10), and two steps specifically call upon the United 
States and Russia (Steps 7 and 8). This not only reflects that the obligation to disarm primarily 
rests with the NWSs, but that the United States and Russia play a superior role in achieving the 
goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.178 The steps relate to each other, and several of the steps 
overlap. Each of the steps is briefly presented, and the extent to which it is adhered to by the 
United States briefly analysed. The steps are given in italics. The findings of the analysis are 
summarised in Table 4. 
 
Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without 
conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) seeks to halt nuclear testing once and for 
all by banning nuclear tests everywhere.179 By preventing states from testing nuclear weapons, it 
is claimed that the CTBT will make it close to impossible for any additional nuclear power to 
arise, as well as making it very difficult for existing nuclear powers to develop new nuclear 
weapons because they would be banned from testing if and how new weapons work.180 The 
CTBT is thus not only a key for preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation, but also for stopping 
qualitative vertical nuclear proliferation.181 Further, the CTBT aims at establishing a worldwide 
verification system, the International Monitoring System (IMS), using multiple-sensor 
                                                 
178 The United States and Russia control more than 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world (Bunn and 
Rhinelander, 2008). 
179 Nuclear tests have been conducted to achieve a range of objectives, including improving existing nuclear weapon 
designs, developing new weapons, understanding nuclear weapons’ effects, maintaining reliability and safety of a 
nuclear weapon arsenal, intimidating or showing resolve and capabilities, and finding so-called peaceful uses for 
industrial purposes (Diehl and Moltz, 2008:214). From 1945 to 1963 most nuclear tests took place in the atmosphere, 
which provided the opportunity to examine the effects of the weapon on real targets. In 1963 the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which prohibited tests in the 
atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, limiting testing to underground locations. 
180 Bunn (2006:83), Diehl, and Moltz (2008:59) 
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technologies to detect any suspect explosions.182 The CTBT has been signed by a large number of 
states, demonstrating widespread support.183 However, the treaty has yet not entered into force. In 
order to enter into force, the CTBT must be ratified by 44 nuclear capable states.184 Of these 44 
states, so far 41 states have signed the CTBT, and only 35 states have ratified the treaty.185 
 
The United States has been a major driving force in achieving the CTBT by motivating other 
states, leading and concluding negotiations, investing into the development and implementation 
of verification technologies, and by being the first state to sign the treaty at the United Nations in 
New York on September 24, 1996. However, despite these efforts, the U.S. Senate on October 
13, 1999, refused to consent to ratify the CTBT.186 Under the presidency of George W. Bush the 
United States has formally withdrawn U.S. support for the CTBT.187 Although the United States 
is not the only party responsible for the CTBT not entering into force, it is the only of the five 
NWSs to reject the CTBT all together.188 This is not compatible with Step 1. 
 
Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions 
pending entry into force of that Treaty. 
 
From July 16, 1945 until September 23, 1992 the United States conducted 1.054 nuclear tests.189 
On October 2, September 1992, the United States entered into a unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
weapons testing.190 With the signing of the CTBT on September 24, 1996, the United States 
further committed itself from refraining from nuclear weapons testing. Although it did not ratify 
the CTBT, the articles of the treaty are honoured and further tests have not occurred.  
                                                 
182 The IMS consists of a network of stations using complementary technologies capable to register vibrations 
underground, in the sea, and in the air, as well as detecting traces of radio-nuclides released into the atmosphere. The 
stations are supported by laboratories, with the possibility of on-site inspections. The IMS is supervised by the 
Vienna-based CTBT Organisation (www.ctbt.org). 
183 178 states have signed the treaty, of which 144 have ratified it (www.ctbt.org). 
184 See Annex 2 of the CTBT for a complete list of the 44 states needed to ratify the treaty in order for it to enter into 
force. 
185 As of June 20, 2008, the three states not having signed the CTBT are India, the DPRK, and Pakistan. CTBT status 
of signature and ratification is available at www.ctbto.org. 
186 Sauer (2005) 
187 2002 Nuclear Posture Review 
188 The PRC has not ratified the CTBT either, but it does not oppose the treaty. The PRC claims that it will ratify the 
treaty if the United States ratifies it first (Bunn, 2006:84, Sauer, 2005:57). 
189 For a complete list and more information of the nuclear tests conducted by the  United States, see 
www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/historical/DOENV_209_REV15.pdf. 
190 Ford (2007:417) 
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However, the request of the Bush administration for research to modify existing nuclear weapons 
and its expressed interest in new nuclear weapon systems (se also Step 9c) may have pushed 
testing needs.191 Without testing, the United States would probably find it difficult or impossible 
to build and certify the safety and reliability of such new nuclear weapon concepts.192 This 
assumption is strengthened by the fact that the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) emphasises 
the importance of maintaining high test-readiness and underlining that it “may not be possible for 
the indefinite future” to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing.193 The 2004 Defence 
Authorisation Act followed up on the NPR by including provision that authorise enhanced test 
readiness from between 24-36 month to 18 months.194 Further, the NPR states that the United 
States “each year […] will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing.” Nevertheless, although 
the United States does not rule out future testing and has displayed an interest in restoring U.S. 
ability to conduct underground nuclear testing, it has not tested or decided to test since it put in 
place its moratorium on nuclear testing.195 The U.S. moratorium remains in place, which is 
consistent with Step 2. 
 
Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in 
accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained 
therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation 
objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which 
includes a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 
 
Of the Thirteen Steps, only Step 3 has been assigned a specific timetable for its completion. This 
indicates that its completion has been given prominence. Fissile material is an essential ingredient 
in any nuclear explosive, and thus poses the main obstacle to the building of nuclear weapons. A 
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treaty banning the production of fissile material would hence not only be an important asset in 
preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation, but also limit quantitative vertical nuclear 
proliferation.196 On January 25, 1994 the Conference on Disarmament197 appointed Ambassador 
Gerald E. Shannon of Canada as “Special Coordinator” to solicit the views of its members on the 
most appropriate arrangements for negotiating a so-called Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT).198 In June, the Special Coordinator reported that there was consensus among the 
members of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiating a FMCT at the conference.199 Based 
on this report, the Conference on Disarmament on March 23, 1995, agreed to mandate a 
committee to begin negotiations.200  
 
Although the time-limit to bring to a conclusion within five years a FMCT in accordance with the 
mandate has already been exceeded, the United States supports such a treaty, and has called for 
its conclusion as soon as possible.201 The fact that the United States has not enriched uranium for 
nuclear explosive purposes since 1964, and has not produced plutonium for such uses since 1988, 
consolidate the U.S. position.202 To this end, the United States on May 19, 2006 submitted a draft 
FMCT to the Conference on Disarmament, becoming the first state to do so.203 The United States 
thus provided the Conference on Disarmament with something concrete to work with and an 
opportunity to conclude a FMCT.204 However, the U.S. draft does not include any verification 
provisions, thus terminating the consensus of the negotiation mandate which calls for the FMCT 
to be “internationally and effectively verifiable.” The position of the Bush administration is that 
effective monitoring of compliance with a FMCT cannot be achieved, and that one thus should 
not further postpone the conclusion of such a treaty by spending time negotiating a verification 
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system.205 Instead the United States advocates an ad-hoc system of verification wherein states 
would monitor the compliance of other states through their own national intelligence 
mechanisms. So far, the United States is isolated on its position. Taking away the verification 
provisions is not compatible with Step 4, which specifically calls for a FMCT to be 
“internationally and effectively verifiable.”206 
 
Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate 
subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on 
Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate 
establishment of such a body. 
 
The establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of a body mandated to deal with 
nuclear disarmament would provide a venue within which disarmament negotiations could be 
advanced. However, the Conference on Disarmament remains deadlocked. The rules of 
procedure used in the Conference on Disarmament include the consensus rule in all decisions, 
including the agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to start negotiations. Due to the different 
positions of key states, consensus has eluded so far. Reasons for the stalemate are manifold. 
Although an in-depth assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, a major cause of the stalemate 
is that China and Russia view U.S. ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans and space ambitions as 
a threat.207 By insisting on the establishment of a ballistic missile defence system (BMD), and 
thus holding open the possibility of placing weapons in space, U.S. nuclear policy, although not 
solely responsible, constitutes an obstacle for the fulfilment of Step 4. 
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Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other 
related arms control and reduction measures. 
 
In order to ensure that nuclear warheads and weapons-usable fissile materials cannot be returned 
to active inventories, Step 5 calls for all disarmament measures to be permanent. Current U.S. 
nuclear policy does not appear to support this principle. The Bush administration explicitly did 
not apply the principle of irreversibility in negotiating the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (SORT), which is the only major nuclear disarmament agreement the United States has 
signed since the formulation of the Thirteen Steps.208 Although the SORT reduces by 2012 the 
number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia to 
1.700 to 2.200 weapons each, the treaty does not require the destruction of even a single warhead. 
Instead the SORT merely requires that operationally deployed nuclear weapons be transferred to 
the reserve stockpile. On January 1, 2013, the date on which the SORT expires, the two parties 
are free to redeploy their nuclear forces.209 This is clearly not in conformity with permanent 
nuclear disarmament.  
 
Moreover, the United States has conditioned further dismantlement of its nuclear weapons on the 
restoration of U.S. nuclear weapons production capability.210 According to the 2002 NPR, the 
precise U.S. nuclear force level for the future cannot be predicted with certainty in a fluid 
security environment. Especially, it is argued, U.S. planning must take into account that, although 
relations with Russia have improved considerably, the future course of Russia cannot be charted 
with certainty. In the event that relations with Russia worsen in the future, the United States may 
need to revise its nuclear force levels, the NPR argues. A responsive nuclear infrastructure, able 
to respond to large strategic changes, is therefore deemed “indispensable” in order to permit the 
United States to reduce further the overall number of nuclear warheads.211 Moreover, so the 
argument goes, a modern nuclear complex would deter adversaries from trying to seek a military 
advantage over the United States. A reliable nuclear infrastructure has thus been made a 
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cornerstone of the “New Triad” (see Step 9e), and the Bush administration has undertaken 
considerable efforts to increase the U.S. capability to produce new warheads.212 
 
Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total 
elimination of their nuclear arsenal leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties 
are committed under Article VI. 
 
As noted in chapter 2.3.1, Step 6 can be understood as a restatement of the disarmament 
commitment pertained in Article VI of the NPT in much less ambiguous, far more explicit 
language.213 Step 6 requires that the NWSs make progress towards the elimination of their 
nuclear arsenals in a way that is completely clear and without any possibility of doubt. 
 
As the overall analysis of U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Thirteen Steps shows; U.S. 
nuclear disarmament efforts seem all but unequivocal. Although the United States upholds its 
moratorium on nuclear testing and has not decided to test (Step 2), it has refused to ratify the 
CTBT (Step 1) and has made preparations to resume testing if deemed necessary, a decision 
which, according to the NPR, is taken on a year-by-year basis (see Step 2). Although the United 
States has substantially reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile through the SORT, the SORT does 
not require the dismantlement of even a single warhead (se Step 5). Moreover, the Bush 
administration has tied further U.S. reductions to the establishment of a new nuclear weapons 
infrastructure with the capability to produce new warheads.214 In parallel, the administration has 
proposed to resume industrial-scale production of new, more reliable, nuclear weapons in order to 
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ensure the indefinite reliability of its nuclear weapons.215 The problem is the Bush administration 
promises to eliminate older warhead models only after new weapons are in place, meaning that 
the U.S. will be building more nuclear weapons in order to have less.216 In addition, the United 
States has given priority to life extension of the warheads that are slated to remain in the enduring 
stockpile rather than dismantle retired warheads.217 In 2007 only 250 warheads were dismantled, 
compared with an average of almost 1.800 warheads per year in the 1990s.218 As a result, 
dismantling the current backlog of retired warheads will not be completed until 2023. The United 
States has also reemphasised its reliance on nuclear weapons for national security (see Step 9e), 
decided to keep information relating to the size of it nuclear arsenal classified (Step 9b), and 
opposes international verification efforts which affect its own nuclear activities (Step 3 and 13). 
In short, U.S. disarmament efforts appear inconclusive and sporadic. They do not give an 
unequivocal impression that the United States seeks the total elimination of its nuclear arsenal. 
On the contrary, it appears that the United States is planning for the retention of nuclear weapons 
for an indefinite future. 
 
Step 7: The early into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III 
as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of 
strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in 
accordance with its provisions. 
 
Together, Russia and the United States possess more than 95 percent of the total number of 
nuclear weapons on our planet. Reducing the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals is therefore 
imperative in order to achieve nuclear disarmament. The call for the entering into force and 
implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) II and III can be understood 
as recognition of this.  
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The START II and III were meant to be successors to the START I, a bilateral arms control treaty 
signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991 and entered into force in 
December 1994.219 The START I bars the two NWSs from deploying more than 6.000 strategic 
nuclear warheads. The START II, further limiting the deployed strategic nuclear weapons on 
each side to 3.000-3.500 weapons, and calling for the elimination of ICBMs able to carry several 
warheads for individual targets,220 was signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on 
January 3, 1993. Immediately after the signing of the START II, discussion started on how to 
proceed to a START III Treaty, which would further reduce the levels of deployed strategic 
weapons to 2.000-2.500 warheads, and, for the first time, promote the irreversible destruction of 
strategic nuclear warheads, including the elimination of the fissile materials from dismantled 
warheads. However, the START II and thus the START III never entered into force.221 
 
While the U.S. Senate ratified the START II on January 26, 1996, the Russian Duma delayed its 
ratification of the treaty until April 14, 2000. Moreover, Russia made its ratification dependent 
upon the preservation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), which had limited the 
arms race during the Cold War by banning large-scale ballistic missile defence systems, 
including space-based components.222 In order to freely pursue its plans for a BMD, the United 
States gave formal notice to Russia on December 13, 2001, that it would unilaterally withdraw 
from the ABMT, which it then did on June 13, 2002.223 The United States thus made itself the 
first actor to permanently withdraw from an important nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
agreement.224 The day after the United States withdrew from the ABMT, Russia withdrew its 
ratification of the START II.225 The START II faded away and further discussions on the START 
III treaty became futile.226 Although the U.S. withdrawal from the ABMT may not have been the 
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only reason for the demise of START II and III, withdrawing from the ABMT is clearly not 
compatible with Step 7. 
 
Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States 
of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
 
While Step 3 attempts to ban the production of additional fissile materials, Step 8 focuses on the 
removal of existing fissile materials. The elimination of surplus fissile materials would eliminate 
the possibility of the materials being diverted into making nuclear weapons. The Trilateral 
Initiative was an effort begun in September 1996 by Russia, the United States and the IAEA to 
develop a verification system which would permit the IAEA to monitor and verify permanent 
removals of weapons-grade plutonium that the two NWSs had each declared excess to their 
weapon needs.227 Such a system was needed because the IAEA safeguards system under the NPT 
is only designed to prevent peaceful nuclear materials and facilities in NNWSs from being used 
for military purposes, and not set up to cope with nuclear materials tied to weapons programs or 
with inspections at locations that have or had such programs.228 Moreover, the methods and the 
overall framework had to be designed to protect classified information and to ensure that the 
United States and Russia meet their obligations under Article I of the NPT, which prohibits the 
NWSs to transfer ownership or control to “any recipient whatsoever” of nuclear weapons directly 
or indirectly. IAEA access would therefore have to be restricted to prevent nuclear secrets from 
leaking out. The initiative thus sought to broaden the items that could be brought under IAEA 
monitoring to include any classified items containing plutonium, including nuclear warheads, 
warhead components, pits, or other sensitive items. The initiative also sought to ensure that these 
items would be permanently safeguarded, unlike material submitted to IAEA monitoring under 
existing voluntary agreements. If successful, the Trilateral Initiative would result in the first 
IAEA verification regime designed for disarmament purposes.229 Such a regime could also 
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provide a framework for verifying excess fissile material in all states possessing nuclear 
weapons.230 
 
According to Thomas Shea, head of the IAEA Trilateral Initiative Office over the full duration of 
its activities, the United States and Russia were on the brink of agreeing to a model verification 
agreement when the new Bush and Putin administrations brought the initiative to a halt in 
November 2001.231 By the time of the 2002 IAEA General Conference, the United States and 
Russia had agreed that the initiative should be brought to a close, concluding that it had been a 
success and that it was now up to the states to enter into individual implementation agreements 
with the IAEA.232 The 2002 Final Report of the Joint Working Group to the Trilateral Initiative 
Principals in many ways supported this conclusion, stating that “the enabling technologies 
developed under the Initiative could be employed by the IAEA on any form of plutonium in 
nuclear facilities, without revealing nuclear weapons information.”233 However, no nuclear 
materials have yet been placed under these verification agreements, and the implementation of 
the Trilateral Initiative seems to have come to a complete stand-still.234 
 
Step 9: Steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that 
promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: 
 
a) Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals 
unilaterally. 
 
Step 9a calls on each NWS to reduce its own nuclear arsenals without waiting for the other 
NWSs to do the same. Because unilateral disarmament does not require negotiations with other 
parties, it can be implemented swiftly. On the negative side, unilateral disarmament can easily be 
halted or reversed because disarmament measures have not been formally negotiated, which 
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means that they are not legally binding, and normally not accountable through monitoring or 
verification.235  
 
Since the adoption of the Thirteen Steps, the United Sates has announced unilateral reductions on 
two occasions. In June 2004, Bush initiated the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP), by 
which he sought to unilaterally cut the total U.S. stockpile of active and inactive warheads by 
nearly 50 percent from the 2001 level until 2012.236 These reductions were implemented five 
years ahead of schedule, in 2007, when the total stockpile of active and inactive consisted of no 
more than 5.400 warheads.237 On December 18, 2007, Bush therefore made a decision to make an 
additional unilateral cut of the remaining stockpile by another 15 percent until 2012.238 Of the 
5.400 warheads in 2007, this meant that about 800 additional warheads would be cut.239 
However, the reductions have occurred largely on paper. Although the weapons officially have 
been transferred from the Department of Defence (DOD) to the Department of energy (DOE), 
where the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for dismantling them, 
the weapons remain mostly at their bases because the DOE does not have the capacity to store 
them.240 Moreover, because the United States has put priority on extending the service life of 
nuclear weapons scheduled to remain in the U.S. stockpile, the actual destruction of the retired 
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b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons 
capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a 
voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
This step calls upon the NWSs to provide information about their ability to take nuclear actions, 
including the aggregate number of nuclear warheads and stocks of fissile materials, as well as on 
the dismantlement of warheads and on the abolishment of fissile materials.242 Nuclear 
transparency would give a realistic picture of the current situation and is thus a precondition for 
effective efforts to stem proliferation and make progress towards disarmament. Major sources of 
proliferation-relevant materials are found in the NWSs, which control them without obligation to 
adhere to international standards or monitoring. Complete accounting records are important to 
determine whether fissile materials or even nuclear weapons could have been illicitly removed. 
Further, transparency is needed in order to be able to verify reductions.243 Any success in nuclear 
weapons reductions will go along with doubts as to whether the reductions are really meaningful 
or whether they merely constitute a shift of warheads to other locations where they are not 
accounted for. Hence, transparency is important in order to build and sustain trust between 
disarming parties, and in order to build and sustain confidence that the nuclear disarmament 
process is taking pace as declared. Transparency of warheads would also give other states a 
realistic image of the capabilities of the individual NWSs, thus preventing unnecessary 
ambiguities and contribute to the prevention of potential new arms races and competitions.  
 
The U.S. supplies by far the most detailed information about its nuclear weapons.244 As an 
outcome of the Openness Initiative, the United States has released an official amount of the total 
number of nuclear warheads in its stockpile up to 1961, the number of warheads retired or 
dismantled up to 1994, the number assembled each year, and some additional technical 
information on its nuclear warheads.245 This has enabled independent observers to collect quite 
comprehensive and unambiguous lists of warhead-related data from information in the public 
                                                 
242 Schaper (2004) 
243 Schaper (2004) 
244 Schaper (2004) 
245 Schaper (2004) 
   
 60 
domain. The United States and the United Kingdom are also the only NWSs to have made public 
the total size of their stocks of HEU.246 However, the U.S. government neither confirms nor 
denies estimates on its nuclear stockpile. In 1999 the Pentagon decided to classify the number of 
nuclear warheads being dismantled, and the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile.247 In 
addition, when it comes to the nuclear disarmament agreements, the United States has come to 
oppose international verification measures which would affect its own activities (see also Step 
13). In contrast to START II and III, neither of which entered into force, the SORT does not 
provide for any transparency or verification measures. 
 
c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives 
and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. 
 
Depending on the level of military planning to which they are confined, nuclear weapons are 
often divided into two categories: strategic nuclear weapons, and non-strategic nuclear 
weapons.248 While strategic nuclear weapons are designed to destroy population centres or other 
supposedly valuable objectives in order to deter aggression, non-strategic nuclear weapons are 
intended for short-range use on the battlefield.249 Examples of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
include nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear torpedoes. Although strategic 
nuclear weapons per definition usually have a greater yield, and thus more destructive potential, 
non-strategic nuclear weapons are often deemed the most dangerous due to their portability, 
proximity to battle-zones, lack of strong permissive action links, dangers of pre-delegation, and 
the risk of them being stolen.250 
 
After the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush (senior) on September 27, 1991, 
implemented the Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI), by which he unilaterally pledged to 
substantially reduce the U.S. non-strategic nuclear arsenal.251 The PNI process initiated by Bush 
senior in 1991, reached its final implementation in 2003, by which time the United States had 
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unilaterally dismantled some 3.000 nuclear weapons.252 Since the PNI was announced long 
before the adoption of the Thirteen Steps, the PNI does not constitute further reductions, as called 
for by Step 9a.  
 
Today the United States has approximately 500 tactical nuclear weapons in its active nuclear 
arsenal.253 In addition, an estimated 790 are kept in the inactive arsenal.254 Although non-strategic 
nuclear weapons may have been retired after 2003 as part of the unilateral reductions announced 
by George W. Bush (junior) in 2004 and 2007 (see Step 9a), no additional initiatives particularly 
aimed at reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons have been announced. On the contrary, in the 
2002 NPR the Bush administration calls for the development of new non-strategic nuclear 
weapons with different special capabilities, such as the destruction of hard and deeply buried 
underground facilities. As implied in the NPR, the U.S. Congress on May 9, 2003 lifted the 1993 
Spratt-Furse Amendment, which banned research on non-strategic nuclear weapons.255 The 2004 
Defence Authorisation Act included provisions that authorised funding for a so-called Robust 
Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and an Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concept for the 
development of low-yield nuclear weapons, so-called “mini-nukes.” However, the Bush 
administration removed its request for funding of the weapons in October 2005. While the 
weapon-projects seem to be cancelled, Jane’s Information Group speculates that work geared 
towards the development of a RNEP may continue under another name.256 
 
d) Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons 
systems. 
 
The operational status of nuclear weapons mainly refers to targeting and alert levels.257 The 
operational status is linked to the military role which nuclear weapons are assigned, as I come 
back to under Step 9e. During the Cold War, the United States based its national security on the 
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doctrine of nuclear deterrence.258 To maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, the United 
States maintained a so-called “Nuclear Triad,” referring to the three tiers of its strategic nuclear 
force: long range bombers, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and ballistic missile 
submarines. The purpose of the Triad was to complicate possible Soviet efforts to launch a 
disarming first strike against the United States. To further enhance the credibility of its nuclear 
deterrent, the United States kept its strategic nuclear weapons ready to launch against thousands 
of predetermined targets.259 Maintaining such a high operational status left a very short decision 
time and few safeguards to rule out any possibility of mistaken, unauthorised or accidental 
launches. By calling for a reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, Step 9d 
intends to reduce the risk of an “accidental” nuclear war.260 
 
In its statement at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the United States claimed that it no longer 
targets any state with nuclear weapons on “a day-to-day basis,” as was the case during the Cold 
War.261 However, although targets for U.S. nuclear weapons are formally no longer 
predetermined, all targets are kept in a computer database and could be returned to their previous 
targeting status on short notice.262 This means that a reduction of the operational status of U.S. 
nuclear weapons first and foremost refers to de-alerting. 
 
In 1991 the United States put its bombers on a low alert level, but kept high the alert levels for 
ICBMs and SLBMs, which continue to be able to launch within minutes of a launch order.263 
This is reflected in the 2002 NPR, which states that “a sufficient number of forces must be 
available on short notice.” According to some estimates, one third of the U.S. strategic nuclear 
arsenal remains on launch-ready alert with hundreds of missiles on land and sea fully armed, 
fuelled and ready to strike.264 Moreover, the still-evolving “Global Strike” (see Step 9e) has 
apparently not only revived the continuous high-alert status of bombers, but has further deepened 
                                                 
258 In short, nuclear deterrence relies on the assumption that war becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in 
relation to possible gains nuclear, and that potential aggressors could be deterred because the destructive potential of 
a nuclear retaliation would make the costs of resorting to war unacceptably high (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 
2001:344-397). 
259 Sauer (2005) 
260 Blair (2007) 
261 Sanders (2005) 
262 Sauer (2005:52) 
263 Blair (2007) 
264 Blair (2007) 
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U.S. commitment to keep its nuclear forces on high alert in order to deliver rapid nuclear and 
non-nuclear strikes on targets anywhere on the globe.265 The Global Strike has an operation 
window of up to one hour, which means a short decision window. This is not compatible with 
Step 9d. 
 
e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these 
weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 
 
While Step 9d seeks to avoid hastened or mistaken nuclear use by extending the time required to 
launch nuclear weapons in the active nuclear forces, Step 9e seeks to minimise the risk of nuclear 
use in all its aspects by addressing the underlying behaviour and thinking about nuclear weapons. 
Because some states rely on nuclear weapons for national security, the behaviour and thinking 
about nuclear weapons must be changed in order to facilitate their elimination.  
 
As discussed under Step 9d, nuclear weapons played a huge role in U.S. security policy during 
the Cold War. When the Cold War came to an end, the international security environment 
changed fundamentally, forcing a rethinking of the role for nuclear weapons in U.S. national 
policy.266 In 2001, the United States undertook the latest review of its nuclear posture, parts of 
which it presented in January 2002. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) seeks to adapt U.S. 
nuclear posture to the post-Cold War world. It claims to reduce the role for nuclear weapons in 
U.S. security policy by outlining a “New Triad,” composed of a combination of 1) conventional 
and nuclear offensive strike systems; 2) defences, including a ballistic missile defence system 
(BMD); and 3) a responsive infrastructure able to “provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to 
meet emerging threats.” According to the NPR, without going into too much detail, the New 
Triad has four primary missions: 1) to assure allies and friends, 2) to dissuade future military 
competition, 3) to deter threats against U.S. interests, allies and friends, and 4) to defeat any 
adversary if deterrence fails.267 A fifth mission, to prevent nuclear proliferation and the use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the threat has manifested itself,268 was later added 
                                                 
265 Kristensen (2007) 
266 Kristensen (2008a) 
267 NPR (2002) 
268 The term WMD includes nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
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through the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS).269 The 
doctrine of using nuclear weapons, pre-emptively if necessary, against anyone using WMD 
against the United States, its forces abroad, and friends and allies, was reaffirmed in the 2002 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSWMD). The role of U.S. nuclear 
weapons thus ballooned from deterring nuclear weapons to deterring all forms of WMD.270 
 
The New Triad also moves beyond the old triad by adding defences, such as a BMD. The adding 
of a BMD is not only a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression, but 
will, according to the NPR, make it possible to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to 
enforce deterrence.271 However, according to the Thirteen Steps, all measures under Step 9 
should be implemented in “a way that promotes international stability.” As discussed under Step 
4, the planned establishment of a BMD does not do that. On the contrary, China and Russia have 
expressed concern that a U.S. BMD would undermine their nuclear deterrent and thus weaken 
their national security. Moreover, although the offensive first leg of the New Triad will move 
beyond the offensive old triad, the old triad of ICBMs, strategic bombers and ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) will “continue to play a vital role.”272  
 
The NPR leaves no doubt that nuclear weapons still have a prominent role in U.S. national 
security policy. According to the NPR, nuclear weapons “provide credible military options to 
deter a wide range of threats,” and nuclear capabilities “possess unique properties that give the 
United States options to hold at risk classes of targets important to achieve strategic and political 
objectives.” In addition, the NPR proposes a “new mix” of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, 
calls for the development of new nuclear weapons,273 and even goes so far as to indicating the 
possible use of nuclear weapons to “dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or 
operations that could threaten U.S. interest or those of allies and friends.” In setting requirements 
for its nuclear strike capabilities, the NPR names a broad range of contingencies for which the 
                                                 
269 The NSS is a periodically prepared document by the executive branch of the U.S. government for Congress 
outlining major national security concerns and how the administration plans to deal with them. The NSS of the Bush 
administration was released in September 17, 2002 and reiterated on March 16, 2006. According to the NSS, “the 
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively” to forestall or prevent hostile acts by adversaries. 
270 Kristensen (2007:56) 
271 NPR (2002) 
272 NPR (2002) 
273 Specifically, the document envisions the development of new nuclear weapons with the capability to defeat 
targets able to withstand a non-nuclear attack, such as underground bunkers and facilities. 
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United States must be prepared. Although Russia remains the focus due to the sheer size of its 
nuclear arsenal, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, the DPRK and China, found themselves listed in the 
NPR as possible contingencies involving the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.274 
 
The pre-emption doctrine of the Bush administration was implemented with the creation of 
“Global Strike,” a new military command with the mission to deliver conventional or nuclear 
strikes on any target anywhere in the world.275 The U.S. Strategic Command's new Joint 
Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike, the new command structure 
designed to plan and execute global strikes went fully operational on November 18, 2005.276 
Thus, instead of diminishing the role for nuclear weapons, the United States, despite claiming the 
opposite, has not only reaffirmed the role for nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, but has 
given them new missions.277 
 
f) The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process 
leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 
 
The phrasing “as soon as appropriate” may be a reference to the completion of Step 4, which 
calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body within the Conference on Disarmament to deal 
                                                 
274 In response to the new guidelines set out by the NPR, the U.S. national nuclear war plan was upgraded and re-
named on March 1, 2003 (Kristensen, 2008a).  The strategic war plan of the Cold War, known as the Single 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which primarily focused on the Soviet Union, was replaced by a set of smaller 
and more flexible scenario-driven strike plans, called Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044. 
275 Schell (2007:125), Kristensen (2008a:59) 
276 Global Strike has taken several forms, and is still evolving. For more information on Global Strike see Kristensen 
(2006 and 2008a), as well as www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/globalstrike.htm. The offensive and pre-emptive 
thinking that underpins Global Strike also found its way into the revision of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations, which was released on March 15, 2005. The doctrine lists several scenarios where nuclear weapons 
might be used. Among others does it allow the use of nuclear weapons to pre-empt use of WMD against the United 
States, its friends and allies, to stop potentially overwhelming conventional enemy forces, to end a war on favourable 
U.S. terms, and even to “show U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter enemy from using WMDs.” 
After much controversy, the doctrine was formally cancelled in September 2005 and the Bush administration has 
refused to acknowledge that it has adopted the doctrine in U.S. policy (Speed and May, 2006:272). However, some 
analysts argue that the cancellation simply removed the controversial document from the public domain, and that the 
guidance that directs the use of nuclear weapons remains unchanged by the cancellation 
(www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/canceled.htm). 
277 The role of nuclear weapons presented in the thesis is only a brief overview. The role for nuclear weapons in U.S. 
security policy is subject to frequent updates via guidance documents that change the posture of the weapons and the 
doctrine that guide their use. A chronology of the major known nuclear weapons guidance issued by the White 
House and the military since the Bush administration took office in 2001 can be found on 
www.nukestrat.com/us/guidance.htm. A more detailed presentation of U.S. nuclear war plans, including the Global 
Strike mission, can be found in Kristensen (2008a). 
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with nuclear disarmament. As noted under Step 4, the establishment of such a body has been 
stalled. Nuclear weapon reductions have thus so far been confined to the United States and 
Russia. The other three NWSs have indicated that they will not enter into disarmament talks until 
U.S.-Russian levels drop down to their levels.278 However, the United States and Russia have 
replaced the START II and III with the SORT, which does not require the elimination of any 
nuclear weapons (see Step 5 and 7). Moreover, the START I will expire on December 5, 2009. 
Russia has already complained about the seeming disinterest of the Bush administration in 
pursuing a follow-up agreement.279 Now, for the first time since the process of nuclear arms 
reductions began in the early 1970s, there are no plans for additional agreements.280 The United 
States has clearly stated that it regards nuclear weapons as important for its national security for 
the foreseeable future (Step 9e). The Bush administration has called for a “revitalised” nuclear 
infrastructure (Step 5), and has proposed to resume industrial-scale production of nuclear 
weapons in order to ensure the indefinite reliability of its nuclear weapons (see Step 5, 6 and 
9c).281 These developments do not indicate that the United States seeks to eliminate its nuclear 
arsenal any time soon. 
 
Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile 
material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or 
other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material 
for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military 
programmes. 
 
While Step 8 only addressed U.S. and Russian excess plutonium, Step 10 calls upon all the 
NWSs to verifiably dispose of all their excess fissile materials, both plutonium and HEU.282 The 
rationale behind this step is not only to ensure that fissile materials are not used to build nuclear 
weapons, but also to prevent such materials to fall into the hands of non-state actors.283 
 
                                                 
278 Mærli and Lodgaard (2007) 
279 Nuclear Threat Initiative (2008) 
280 Cirincione (2007:186) 
281 NPR (2002) 
282 In mid-2008, the total global stockpile of weapon-usable plutonium and HEU was estimated to be 500 metric tons 
and 1.370-1.970 metric tons respectively (Global Fissile Material Report 2008). 
283 Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar (2005:45) 
   
 67 
The Trilateral Initiative sought to allow the IAEA to monitor the disposition of plutonium which 
the United States and Russia had each declared excess to their military needs. As discussed under 
Step 8, the United States has not taken any steps towards implementing the monitoring agreement 
developed under the initiative. Independent of the Trilateral Initiative, the United States and 
Russia concluded an agreement on June 4, 2000 referred to as the Plutonium Management and 
Disposition Agreement (PMDA), under which they agreed to dispose most of their excess 
weapon-grade plutonium.284 The United States agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons 
plutonium. In late 2007, the United States declared excess an additional 9 tons of plutonium, for a 
total of 54 tons.285 However, the United States has yet to implement the disposal of the excess 
weapons plutonium it has agreed to dispose.286 
 
Of the total 741 tons of HEU which the United States has produced, 96 tons had been eliminated 
as if mid-2008.287 Another 137 tons have been declared excess, awaiting disposition. The 
disposing occurs primarily by down-blending into LEU as nuclear reactor fuel.288 In this form, 
the material is unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons and can be used as commercial nuclear 
reactor fuel. Additional 128 tons have been earmarked as naval reactor fuel reserves.289  
 
In addition, The United States has implemented several efforts to assist other states in the 
disposition of their excess fissile material. On May 26, 2004 the United States with the IAEA and 
other partners announced an international cooperative effort known as the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), designed to identify and repatriate Russian and U.S. HEU and spent 
reactor fuel worldwide.290 Further, the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP), 
which purpose it is to secure and dismantle WMD and their associated infrastructure in the 
                                                 
284 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no longer Required for 
Defensive Purposes and Related Cooperation (1999) 
285 As of mid-2008, the total U.S. stockpile of plutonium consists of nearly 92 tons (Global Fissile Material Report 
2008). 
286 In order to dispose of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium, the United States will construct three new facilities: 
a facility that will disassemble the cores, or “pits,” of surplus nuclear weapons; a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility that 
will produce mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors; and a Waste Solidification Building to dispose of the 
liquid waste from the other two disposition facilities (National Nuclear Security Administration, 2008b). 
287 Global Fissile Material Report 2008 
288 National Nuclear Security Administration (2008d) 
289 The United States uses HEU to fuel submarine and surface ship propulsion reactors. It is estimated that the 128 
tons set aside for military naval nuclear propulsion will last 40-60 years (Global Fissile Material Report 2008). 
290 IAEA Staff Report (2004) 
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former Soviet Union, was extended for an additional seven years in June 2006.291 On February 
18, 1993 the United States and Russia also made a so-called U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase 
Agreement, in which the United States purchased 500 tons of HEU from Russia to be blended 
down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and consumed in U.S. power reactors.292 The deal will be 
completed in 2013.293 These measures are good example of what Christopher Ford calls 
additional disarmament measures, not among the Thirteen Steps. 
 
Although the United States has made several efforts in disposing of excess fissile material 
worldwide, and has declared as excess to weapons requirements or for all military purposes a 
significant fraction of its stocks of both HEU and plutonium produced for weapons, the Bush 
administration has been reluctant to place its own excess fissile material under IAEA or other 
relevant international verification and arrangements. This is not consistent with the Step 10, 
which specifically calls for international verification. 
 
Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament 
process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 
 
General and complete disarmament refers not only to nuclear weapons, but to all types of 
weapons. The United States has ratified several arms control agreements, such as the 1975 
Biological Weapons Convention,294 the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention,295 the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty,296 the 1972 Seabed Treaty,297 and two of the five protocols of the 1980 Convention 
                                                 
291 The objective of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) is to assist Russia and new states born from 
the collapse of the USSR in providing adequate protection to prevent terrorists and thieves from acquiring nuclear 
materials and technology that could be used to make nuclear weapons (www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/). 
292 Russian-U.S. HEU Agreement (1993) 
293 As of mid-2008 Russia had blended down 337 tons (Global Fissile Material Report 2008). 
294 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1975) 
295 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
Their Destruction (1997) 
296 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967) bans parties from placing WMD in outer space, including Earth orbit, 
the Moon, and other celestial bodies. 
297 on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1972) 
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on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW).298 However, the United States also opposes many 
arms control and disarmament efforts, such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty,299 the 2008 Convention 
on Cluster Munitions,300 the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS),301 and three 
of the protocols of the CCCW. Moreover, U.S. military spending has been on the rise since 
2001.302 
 
In regard to the nuclear sphere, as already discussed under Step 1 and Step 7, the United States 
has refused to ratify the CTBT, has withdrawn from the ABMT, and decided to leave out any 
weapons elimination requirements of the 2002 SORT. Some scholars also point to the recent 
U.S.-India nuclear deal as an example that the United States has given up on the goal of a world 
free from nuclear weapons.303  The deal does not put any disarmament requirements on India, 
which raises questions about the commitment of the United States to nuclear disarmament.304 
These actions and developments do not indicate that the United States follows an objective of 
general complete disarmament under effective international control 
 
                                                 
298 The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (1980) consists of a set of five protocols which 
restrict the use of 1) fragmentation weapons, 2) landmines, 3) incendiary weapons, 4) blinding laser weapons, and 5) 
sets out obligations and best practice for the clearance of explosive remnants of war. The United States has only 
adopted two of the five protocols (Protocol 1 and 2), the minimum required to be considered a signatory. 
299 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction (1997) 
300 The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions, a 
type of weapon which scatters small bombs over an area. The convention was opened for signature in Oslo on 
December 3, 2008. The Untied States is in outright opposition to the ban. 
301 PAROS would complement the Outer Space Treaty by preventing space weaponisation and programs, such as 
BMD systems, satellite-guided weapons launched from Earth and spy satellites collecting and using data for 
offensive military purposes. Each year in the general assembly, member states adopt a resolution on the PAROS by 
an overwhelming majority. Every state votes in favour of negotiating a treaty on PAROS, except the United States. 
Most recently, the United States dismissed a draft proposal submitted on February 12, 2008, by Russia and China to 
the Conference on Disarmament on banning weaponisation of space (Reaching Critical Will, 2008). 
302 During fiscal years 2001-2007 U.S. military expenditure increased by 85 percent in nominal terms and by 59 
percent in real terms (SIPRI Yearbook 2008). 
303 The U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008, gave final approval to an agreement facilitating nuclear cooperation 
between the United States and India (Pan and Jayshree, 2008). Under the agreement India gets access to U.S. nuclear 
fuel, reactors and technology, overturning a ban on such trade instituted after India first conducted a nuclear test in 
1974. In exchange, India has agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place civil facilities under 
IAEA safeguards. This makes India the only known state with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but 
still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with states parties to the NPT. The deal is controversial, and critics claim 
that the deal not only moderates the disincentives for nuclear proliferation, but may encourage more states to 
proliferate (Weiss, 2006). 
304 Weiss (2006) 
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Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all 
States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the Decision on 
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8 1996. 
 
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the states parties to the NPT agreed to 
strengthen the review process of the NPT.305 The strengthened review process provides that 
substantive issues shall be considered at preparatory conferences prior to each review conference 
in order to promote the full implementation of the treaty. It was also agreed that the review 
conferences should look forward as well as back, by evaluating the implementation of the NPT in 
the period under review, as well as identifying areas in which, and the means through which, 
further progress, including the universality of the treaty, should be sought in the future. By 
referring to Paragraph 4(c) of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice, Step 12 calls upon all states parties to the NPT to report at the Preparatory Conferences 
and the Review Conferences both on their progress towards nuclear disarmament, as well as 
proposing measures by which the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can be 
achieved.306  
 
Although the United States regularly reports actions by which it claims to be fulfilling its Article 
VI-obligation, it underlines that it provides information on a voluntary basis.307 Moreover, as 
already noted under Step 9b, the United States in 1999 decided to classify the number of 
                                                 
305 Decision 1: “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,” Final Paper of the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference  
306 “The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear 
weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Paragraph 4(c) of the Decision on “Principles and 
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”). The 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons states that the obligation pertained in Article VI is an obligation to achieve the 
result of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. 
307 See for example the U.S. statement to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Here Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders, 
Special Representative of the President for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stated that “the United States 
values these opportunities to volunteer information on its policies, activities, and achievements contributing to the 
universal implementation of all substantive articles of the Treaty, including Article VI.”  
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warheads being dismantled.308 This makes it difficult to assess the implementation of Article VI 
over time. 
 
Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide 
assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and 
maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
 
Verification can be understood as the “process of gathering and analysing information to make a 
judgement about parties’ compliance or non-compliance with an agreement.”309 Verification of 
compliance is crucial for ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.310 It also builds trust 
between the states parties to a given agreement, and maintains confidence in the disarmament 
process.311  
 
Although the United States is not obligated to submit to IAEA safeguards, the United States on 
November 18, 1977 concluded a voluntary agreement with the IAEA for applications of 
safeguards on some of its peaceful nuclear activities.312 The United States also supports the 
Additional Protocol to its voluntary offer agreement. However, the U.S. version of the agreement 
contains an exclusive clause, which permits the United States to restrict IAEA inspections in 
respect to activities of “direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or 
information associated with such activities.”313  
 
Recalling the definition of nuclear disarmament presented in chapter 1.4, nuclear disarmament 
cannot take place without vertical non-proliferation. This view is reflected by the importance 
given to a FMCT and the CTBT, which reduce the possibility of qualitative and quantitative 
vertical proliferation, as steps towards the achievement and maintanence of a nuclear-weapon-
free world (see Step 1 and Step 3). As discussed under Step 3, the United States opposes a FMCT 
with verifiable capabilities. While the United States does not support the CTBT (see Step 1), the 
                                                 
308 Kile, Fedchenko and Kristensen (2008) 
309 Persbo and Bjørningstad (2008) 
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Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applications 
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United States continues to work with the CTBTO on IMS-related activities. Until 2005 the 
United States funded 19 million $ out of the 105 million $ budget of the CTBTO, much of which 
went to the funding and the further development of the IMS.314 On November 10, 2005, however, 
the U.S. Congress started to cut its share of contributions to the CTBTO funding, including its 
verification system, which has continued to decrease since.315 
 
Moreover, the United States did not put in place verification mechanisms in the SORT (see Step 
5), and has withdrawn its support from the Trilateral Initiative (Step 8). However, the United 
States remains accountable under START I. START I was completed in 2001 and is being fully 
verified under a system of intrusive on-site inspections and information exchanges. However, 
START I is due to expire on December 5, 2009 unless extended by that time. Negotiations on 
extending the treaty have yet to take place. In sum, the United States does not seem to support 
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Table 4: Compatibility between U.S. nuclear weapons policy and the thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation 
Step# Issue U.S. policy 
1 CTBT Rejects the CTBT 
2 Test moratorium Moratorium remains in place 
3 Verifiable FMCT Opposes verification 
4 Subsidiary body on nuclear 
disarmament 
BMD-plans obstruct progress 
5 Irreversibility Not applied in the SORT; further reductions have been tied to the restoration 
of nuclear weapons production capability 
6 Unequivocal undertaking Disarmament efforts appear inconclusive and sporadic 
7 START II and III, ABMT Withdrew from the ABMT 
8 Trilateral Initiative Set aside without implementation 
9a Unilateral reductions Initiated the NWSP in 2004 and announced additional unilateral cuts in 2007 
9b Transparency Has classified information relating to the size of its nuclear arsenal 
9c Non-strategic reductions None beyond the PNI; contemplates the development of new non-strategic 
weapons 
9d Reduce operational status Alert status remains high  
9e Diminish role for nuclear 
weapons 
Continues to rely on nuclear weapons for national security; nuclear weapons 
have been assigned additional tasks 
9f Total elimination of its 
nuclear weapons 
Has made efforts for the retention and modernisation of its nuclear arsenal 
and complex 
10 Verified removal of excess 
fissile materials 
Has declared significant fissile materials to be excess, but has been reluctant 
to place the materials under international  verification 
11 Reaffirm goal of GCD Opposes many arms control efforts and has increased military expenditure; 
has come to differentiate between “good” and “bad” nuclear weapons 
12 Reporting Has classified the number of nuclear warheads being dismantled 
13 Verification Seems to reject verification measures which would affect its own 
disarmament efforts 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis (see table 4) in order to answer the research 
questions. 
 
5.1. U.S. nuclear weapons policy and its impact on the NPT 
The first research question the thesis set out to answer was: “Is U.S. nuclear weapons policy 
compatible with a strong and effective NPT?” In order to answer this question, the NPT and the 
pressures it is exposed to were explored (chapter 2). Here it was argued that the NPT can be 
understood as the result of a bargaining process, in which the NNWSs gained benefits and 
concessions which made it worthwhile to tolerate the discriminatory nature of the treaty. The 
obligation to disarm, pertained in Article VI of the NPT, is an essential part of this bargain. 
Although Article VI does not have undisputed legal standing, nuclear disarmament has great 
political importance and relevance. In order for the NPT to remain strong and effective, nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament must go hand in hand. Being a NWS, U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy first and foremost affects the viability of the NPT by the extent to which the United States 
is making a serious effort toward fulfilling its obligation of nuclear disarmament. In order to 
assess whether U.S. nuclear weapons policy is compatible with nuclear disarmament, and thus 
whether this policy is compatible with a strong and effective NPT, U.S. nuclear policy was 
analysed in light of the Thirteen Steps. 
 
As seen in table 4, U.S. nuclear policy contravenes the Thirteen Steps in a number of respects. 
Contrary to the steps, the United States has rejected the CTBT (Step 1); it does not support a 
verifiable FMCT (Step 3); it has not applied the principle of irreversibility in the SORT, and has 
tied further reductions of its nuclear arsenal to the capacity to produce new nuclear warheads 
(Step 5); its nuclear disarmament efforts appear sporadic and inconclusive, thus leaving room for 
doubt about its intentions to rid itself of its nuclear arsenal (Step 6); it has withdrawn from the 
ABMT, thus ensuring the failure of the START II and START III (Step 7); it set aside the 
Trilateral Initiative without implementation (Step 8); it has classified information relating to the 
size of its nuclear weapons stock (Step 9b and 12); it has not announced additional reductions in 
its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, but has contemplated the development of new non-strategic 
nuclear weapons (Step 9c); it has not only decided to keep its ICBMs and SSBNs on high alert, 
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but the Global Strike mission seems to have put nuclear equipped bombers back on high alert as 
well (Step 9d); it has reemphasised the importance of nuclear weapons in its security policy and 
even expanded the role for nuclear weapons (Step 9e); it has called for the modernisation and 
indefinite retention of its nuclear weapons and nuclear complex (Step 9f); it opposes verified 
removal of U.S. fissile materials which it has declared to be excess to its military needs (Step 10); 
it opposes several arms control agreements, has greatly increased its military spending, and has 
come to except key allies from pressure to disarm (Step 11); and it rejects having its nuclear 
activities subjected to international verification (Step 3, 8, 10 and 13).  
 
The tendency of incompatibility stands at great risk of outweighing U.S. nuclear policy initiatives 
which are in support of the Thirteen Steps. In conformity with the Thirteen Steps, the United 
States has upheld its moratorium on nuclear testing (Step 2), and it has announced unilateral 
nuclear weapon cuts (Step 9a). However, U.S. disarmament efforts relating to Step 2 and 9a are 
not unequivocal (see Step 6). Although the United States has, in consistency with Step 2, not 
tested or decided to conduct nuclear tests since it put in place its moratorium on nuclear testing, it 
has made clear that it does not rule out future testing and has undertaken measures to restore its 
ability to conduct underground nuclear testing. Similarly, although the United States has, in 
consistency with Step 9a, declared unilateral cuts in its nuclear arsenal in 2004 and 2007, the 
announced reductions have occurred largely on paper. In sum, therefore, the findings of the 
analysis strongly indicate that U.S. nuclear weapons policy is incompatible with a strong and 
effective NPT. 
 
The second research question builds on the first: “In what ways does U.S. nuclear policy 
underpin the role and strength of the NPT, and how could this policy be policy detrimental to the 
viability of the treaty?” As shown in the theoretical chapter (chapter 2), the failure to disarm 
constitutes a “pressure from above.” Although the United States may not be violating the NPT in 
a legal sense, the findings of the analysis suggest that U.S. nuclear weapons policy is overall 
detrimental to the viability of the NPT. The United States does not live up to the expectations of 
the NNWSs with regards to nuclear disarmament, as reflected by the Thirteen Steps. 
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It is truly extraordinary that so many states agreed to forsake weapons which at the time the NPT 
was negotiated were hailed as the ultimate national security guarantor, and in doing so, in theory, 
submitted themselves at the mercy of the handful of states with the capability to annihilate states 
with “the push of a button.” Without receiving in exchange a promise from the NWSs to rid 
themselves of their nuclear arsenals, the NPT would probably not have been possible in 1970, nor 
would it have been extended in 1995. Regardless of the legal dimension, many NNWSs see 
disarmament as part of the grand bargain that lies at the heart of the NPT: states without nuclear 
weapons agreed to forsake them; states with nuclear weapons agreed to eliminate them.  
 
By continuing a policy which not only disregards nuclear disarmament, but in many respects runs 
directly contrary to nuclear arms reductions, the United States is undermining the foundation of 
the NPT. The health, effectiveness, progress and future of the NPT depends on the reactions of 
the large number of NNWSs which see Article VI as important. It affects their incentives to 
respect the regime, their willingness to cooperate, the likelihood that some of them will wish to 
seek nuclear weapons, their willingness to support strong enforcement measures against those 
who violate or abuse the regime.316 
 
Over the long run, the bifurcation of the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” is an 
unstable situation.317 Lack of progress on nuclear disarmament may cause NNWSs to withdraw 
individually or collectively. If some states withdraw from the NPT, many others may follow. This 
would not only increase “pressure from outside,” but the negative spiral of nuclear proliferation 
where one nuclear arsenal gives birth to another, a process which the NPT successfully halted 
more than 35 years ago, may start anew. More than 40 states could produce nuclear weapons, if 
their governments decided to invest the time, money, and political effort to do so.318 However, 
although the DPRK on January 10, 2003, announced its withdrawal from the NPT,319 withdrawal 
from the NPT comes with some difficulties. The NPT is almost universal, and states which would 
withdraw would be isolated and come under political pressure. The immediate unravelling of the 
NPT through mass withdrawal therefore does not seem very likely at this time. 
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A more likely scenario is that the NPT continues to exist, but that the treaty could becomes more 
and more marginalised. Even if no states leave the treaty, the lack of progress on nuclear 
disarmament is already causing dissatisfaction and frustration. Frustration due to the United 
States not living up to its disarmament obligations could makes some NNWSs dig in their heels 
against new ideas that could strengthen non-proliferation efforts and make the NPT more 
effective, regarding restrictions on their nuclear freedom as another form of nuclear apartheid. 
The NPT is only as strong as its member states make it. Not disarming means that the 
discriminatory nature of the NPT, the bifurcation into nuclear haves and not-haves, remains 
intact. This is a total disregard of the interests of the NNWSs, which is further strengthened by 
the unwillingness of the United States to subject its nuclear activities to international verification 
(Step 3, 8, 10 and 13). Despite voluntary safeguards agreements on some of their civilian nuclear 
activities, the NWSs are exempted from international monitoring.320 With some exceptions, 
accurate information on nuclear materials is lacking.321 Introducing verification mechanisms on 
at least some of the nuclear activities of the NWSs, for example in relation with a FMCT, would 
contribute to the reduction of the discriminatory nature of the NPT. Opposing verification sends a 
signal to the NNWSs that the United States intends to uphold the discriminatory nature of the 
NPT not only when it comes to nuclear weapons, but also when it comes to verification and 
transparency. In addition, as I will come back to, U.S. opposition towards verification holds a risk 
of undermining the IAEA safeguards system. 
 
By not disarming in a more dedicated, swift way, the United States projects a message which 
claims that nuclear weapons enhance U.S. security, while in the hands of others, especially states 
not allied with the United States, they are a threat. The United States has for example exempted 
India, a key ally of the United States from pressure to disarm (see Step 11). Differentiating 
between “good nukes” and “bad nukes” goes against the fundamental principle which guides the 
application of the NPT: that all nuclear weapons, regardless of who controls them, constitute a 
threat to world peace and thus should be eliminated. The apparent double standard of the United 
States undermines non-proliferation efforts and thus the goal of achieving a world free from 
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nuclear weapons. Success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends at some 
fundamental level on the ability to make a credible and compelling argument that nuclear 
weapons, regardless of the politics of a particular regime, are neither necessary nor desirable, that 
whatever advantages they confer are outweighed by their costs.322  
 
The ideal normative environment for promoting non-proliferation is one in which nuclear 
weapons are widely or even universally regarded to be illegal, illegitimate and immoral. A 
universal approach is also crucial to rallying international opinion against states that attempt to 
remain outside the NPT.323 Demanding that NNWSs renounce nuclear weapons while claiming 
that nuclear weapons are important to ensure its own national security is hypocritical. If the 
United States does not intend to abide to nuclear disarmament, but rather chooses to rely on 
sustained nuclear capabilities, it will become harder to point to the salience of the non-
proliferation pledge of nuclear abstinence for NNWSs in Article II of the NPT, as well as 
convincing the DNWSs to commit themselves to the same disarmament obligation.324  
 
Similarly, by opposing FMCT-verification measures on the argument that effective monitoring of 
compliance cannot be achieved (Step 3), the United States implies that the NPT itself is not 
verifiable.325 IAEA safeguards can thus be devaluated and their importance as well as acceptance 
could fade. This would make it much more difficult to manage “pressure from within.” Dividing 
nuclear weapons into “good” and “bad” depending on the politics of a particular regime is also 
problematic in this regard because it renders verification superfluous. Contrary to nuclear 
weapons capacity, the intentions of a particular regime cannot be verified. As acknowledged in 
the 2002 NPR, it is difficult to predict whether a current ally or friend will become a future 
adversary or opponent. Intentions can change. Although verification cannot ensure compliance, it 
can produce, if effective, convincing evidence of non-compliance.326 Verification measures 
would also consolidate and strengthen the recognition that nuclear materials are not only a 
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national affair but an international concern.327 As a consequence the nuclear security could 
improve, which would make it easier to manage proliferation “pressure from below.”328 
 
Further, by relying on nuclear weapons for national security while possessing the world’s most 
powerful conventional forces, the United States may be constructing an incentive or increasing an 
existing demand in some NNWSs for seeking nuclear weapons. Acknowledging that possession 
of nuclear weapons in itself can be a powerful motive for other states to acquire nuclear weapons 
(see chapter 2), negative security guarantees play an important role in reassuring NNWSs that 
they do not need to acquire nuclear weapons themselves to deter a nuclear attack by its nuclear 
adversaries. U.S. nuclear weapons policy erodes these assurances. The 2002 NPR contains a list 
of states which could become targets for U.S. nuclear weapons (Step 9e). The states which find 
themselves on the list, may address little value to the negative security assurances given by the 
United States in connection with the extension of the NPT in 1995. Because several of the states 
on the list are NNWSs, the NPR also sends a strong signal to other NNWSs that there is no 
guarantee that NNWSs are immune to U.S. nuclear weapon use.329 U.S. nuclear policy may thus 
drive some states towards nuclear acquisition in order to deter a potential U.S. nuclear strike. 
 
Moreover, the United States may serve as an improper role model for the other NWSs. By 
conveying a policy which does not contribute to the achievement of the Thirteen Steps, the 
United States provides a potential excuse for the other NWSs not to worry about the 
comprehensive fulfilment of their disarmament obligations. Especially the modernisation of U.S. 
nuclear weapons and infrastructure sends a signal to the other NWSs that the United States 
appears to be planning for the indefinite retention of its nuclear arsenal. Renewed interest in the 
usability of non-strategic nuclear weapons (Step 9c) also sets a negative example which could be 
followed by other NWSs.  
 
By making efforts that integrate nuclear weapons better into the armed forces some scholars 
argue that the United States may even “raze the firewall between nuclear and conventional 
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weapons.”330 Since the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the first and only use of 
nuclear weapons, an international taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has been in 
existence.331 This taboo is based on a belief that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different 
than conventional weapons because nuclear weapons cause indiscriminate long-term destruction 
which conventional weapons cannot produce. The Bush administration, however, proposes a 
“new mix” of combining nuclear and conventional weapons (see Step 9e). This has led some 
analysts to the conclusion that the United States thinks of and may use nuclear weapons as it 
would any other weapon.332 A breakdown of the firewall between nuclear and conventional 
weapons may prompt other nuclear weapon states to reconsider whether nuclear weapons can be 
used alongside conventional weapons, and thus lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use. 
Russia, for example, expressed alarm about the direction U.S. nuclear weapons policy has taken, 
and has warned that an attempt to remove any distinction between nuclear and conventional 
weapons in combat could lead Russia to reconsider its basic policies and expenditures.333 
Moreover, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABMT (Step 7) combined with U.S. plans to establish a 
BMD (Step 3 and 4) are interpreted as a potential threat by Russia and China. Thus, U.S. nuclear 
policy may not only provide Russia and China with an excuse not to disarm, but may constitute 
an incentive for Russia and China to proliferate vertically. If this would happen, “pressure from 
above” would increase further. 
 
In sum, U.S. nuclear weapons policy is incompatible with a strong and effective NPT. By not 
disarming, U.S. nuclear policy constitutes pressure on the NPT from above. In the long run, this 
could cause states to withdraw from the treaty, possibly leading to a new wave of horizontal 
nuclear proliferation. In the short run, U.S. unwillingness to disarm can make cooperation with 
NNWSs more difficult. This would make it more difficult to run the NPT effectively and manage 
specific proliferation challenges. U.S. nuclear weapons policy could also function as an incentive 
for some NNWSs to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as for the NWSs, especially China and 
Russia, to proliferate vertically. 
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In order to mediate these harmful aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the United States 
should actively change its nuclear policy. In the next chapter section, some recommendations are 
thus offered in regard to the final research question of the thesis: “Should and could the nuclear 
policy of the United States be changed in order to align with the NPT?” 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
As with any arms control treaty, the contracting states need to see it as more beneficial to be part 
of the treaty than to stand outside. The security interests of all states involved must be 
recognised.334 The bargain on which the NPT is based, can be understood as a balance of the 
security interests of the NWSs and the NNWSs. In order for the NPT to remain viable, 
disarmament and non-proliferation must go hand in hand, which means that curbs must be 
imposed on both NWSs and NNWSs. The United States must adhere to its obligation to disarm in 
order for the NPT to be viable. Hence, U.S. nuclear weapons policy must change track. 
 
The United States should reaffirm its political commitment to reducing the dangers that arise 
from all existing nuclear weapons, as well as from further horizontal and vertical proliferation, 
and to seeking the achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. In addition to an official 
statement of reaffirmation, the United State should back up its support by implementing concrete 
disarmament measures. Because the Thirteen Steps have been agreed upon by all states parties 
through consensus, U.S. actions should reflect these steps. At the very least, some of the steps 
should be swiftly implemented. Bring into force the CTBT, for example, would not only signal a 
change of track, but could spur other states, like China and India, to ratify the treaty as well. 
 
Cutting nuclear weapon numbers is perhaps the easiest and symbolically most eye-catching 
effort. However, such cuts must be irreversible and internationally verifiable in order to give both 
states inside and outside the NPT the assurance that the nuclear weapons stay dismantled. In this 
regard, the United States should negotiate with Russia to extend the START I and to codify the 
SORT. This could perhaps be done in relation with negotiations on finding a mutually acceptable 
political solution to the U.S.-planned BMD, which Russia sees a potential threat to its national 
security. 
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Ideally, the United States should publish regular reports on its nuclear stockpile and 
dismantlement. This would also send out the message that the United States is willing to soften 
the discriminatory segregation of the NPT, and that it takes the interests of the NNWSs seriously. 
Whatever steps the United States takes to signal its willingness to live up to its disarmament 
obligation, U.S. commitment must be unequivocal: it must be clear and beyond any doubt. This 
means that the United States must refrain from any modernisation and new development of 
nuclear weapons. Significant progress in the direction of nuclear disarmament should be visible 
by the time of the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. A constructive idea in this regard, as 
proposed by Sverre Lodgaard, could be to call a UN summit meeting in the autumn of 2009 at 
which the link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament could be reconfirmed in order 
to lay the foundations for a successful review conference in 2010.335 
 
As Christopher Ford points out, the overall security environment plays an important role in 
making nuclear disarmament possible, and all states parties, both NWSs and NNWSs, have an 
obligation in ensuring the continuation of nuclear disarmament.336 However, the linkage between 
nuclear possession and proliferation goes both ways. Just as NNWSs which seek to acquire 
nuclear weapons undermine nuclear disarmament efforts, so does the United States run the risk of 
providing states with an excuse or incentive to proliferate, vertically or horizontally. Removing 
excuses and reducing proliferation incentives should thus be made a priority in U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy. Most importantly in this regard, the United States should de-emphasise the 
importance of nuclear weapons by reducing its dependency on nuclear weapons for national 
security. In order to reduce the incentives for China and Russia to proliferate vertically, the 
United States should reconsider the establishment of a BMD, including the militarization of 
space. A possible BMD must be based on an agreement of all concerned parties in order not to 
jeopardize the progress achieved thus far in reducing nuclear weapons. Sino-Russian concerns 
must be resolved. Making legally binding negative security guarantees to NNWSs would 
moreover offer a strong disincentive for NNWSs to seek nuclear weapons in order to ensure their 
national security. Respecting existing restraints on both use and threat of military force is also 
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important in this regard.337 Moreover, the United States should be careful not to de-evaluate 
existing IAEA-safeguards by arguing that verification measures are ineffective and unreliable. It 
should therefore revert to its former position on a verifiable FMCT. Achieving a good standing 
for serious disarmament efforts would also give the United States more legitimacy in dealing 
with incidents of treaty violations at the hands of NNWSs. 
 
In sum, the following changes are essential to mediate harmful aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy: 
 
• Reinstate the main principle underlying the NPT: all nuclear weapons are a threat and 
should be abolished, regardless of their possessors and their intentions 
• Reconfirm the validity of the NPT-bargain through words and action(s), for example by 
ratifying the CTBT 
• Reductions must be irreversible and verifiable; negotiate with Russia on extending the 
START, codifying the SORT and making further reductions 
• Refrain from modernising and developing new nuclear weapons 
• Deemphasise the role for nuclear weapons in national security policy 
• Reconsider the establishment of a BMD; engage Russia and China in order to negotiate a 
political solution 
• Provide legally binding negative security guarantees to the NNWSs 
• Revert to former position on a verifiable FMCT 
 
5.3. Looking ahead 
What is needed in order to lift the negative impact of U.S. nuclear weapons policy on the NPT is 
one thing; what can be achieved within the political mindsets of the United States may be quite 
another.338 U.S. policy on nuclear weapons at any given time represents a number of competing 
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interests.339 In order to overcome opposition to change, a personal commitment of the U.S. 
president is vital.340 The president must have the will and courage to take the lead, as well as the 
political capacity to push through changes.341 The inauguration of Barrack Hussein Obama as 
president of the United States of America on January 20, 2009, thus poses a window of 
opportunity to bring U.S. nuclear policy into a different track. Looking at Obama’s standing on 
issues related to nuclear weapons can give some indication of the future direction of U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy, and thus whether a change of track is possible. 
 
Although nuclear weapons provoked little discussion during the presidential election campaign, 
Obama has promised to reinstate nuclear disarmament as a central goal of U.S. foreign and 
security policy.342 During the presidential campaign, he pledged to “set a new direction in U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy and show the world that America believes in its existing commitment 
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear 
weapons.”343 Obama opposes the development of new nuclear weapons, wants to negotiate with 
Russia about taking missiles off high alert, backs talks on extending the START I, is willing to 
make further nuclear reductions together with Russia, and is open to whether to go ahead with 
missile defence plans. Obama also pledged to “reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of 
the CTBT at the earliest practical date and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board 
other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.”344  
 
However, Obama has also pledged to “maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons 
exist.”345 This position presents a conundrum for a policy which seeks nuclear disarmament: How 
can one achieve a world without nuclear weapons when all states with nuclear weapons insist on 
keeping their nuclear weapons as long as nuclear weapons exist? Someone has to take the lead.346 
Despite this shortfall, the nuclear policy Obama has put forward, if it became U.S. policy, would 
significantly ease U.S. pressure on the NPT. Further clues about the future of U.S. nuclear 
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weapons policy may be given in the congressionally mandated 2009-2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR).347 The 2009-2010 NPR poses a good opportunity for the Obama administration to 
realign U.S. nuclear weapons policy with the NPT, and thus send a message to the international 
community that the United States is taking nuclear disarmament seriously. 
 
5.4. Final reflections 
This thesis does not claim to take into account all aspects of U.S. nuclear policy which have an 
impact on the viability of the NPT. The thesis is built on a simplified understanding of the 
pressure dynamics affecting the strength and efficiency of the treaty, and has focused on the main 
venue of U.S. impact: nuclear disarmament. With the help of the Thirteen Steps, this thesis has 
shown that current U.S. nuclear policy is incompatible with a strong and effective NPT. The 
Thirteen Steps were well suited as a methodological tool to answer the research questions. 
Addressing both nuclear weapons and the materials required to build them, the Thirteen Steps are 
observable, and thus measurable, over time. Although some of the steps could have been more 
clearly formulated, I believe to have succeeded in interpreting them in the context of the final 
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